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The book of love is long and boring. No one can lift
the damn thing.
It’s full of charts and facts and figures and
instructions for dancing.1

The law of contracts addresses three big questions: When does a
contract come into existence or disappear? What are the parties’
contractual duties, rights, powers and other legal relations? What are the
legal consequences of breach? The answer to each generally depends on
what the parties said and did, before, during or after formation. A very large
portion of contract law therefore involves rules that determine how parties’
words and actions effect changes to their legal relations. These are
sometimes called “rules of interpretation.” For reasons that will be clear
below, I will call them rules of exposition. This article is about contract
rules of exposition, or the rules that connect what contracting parties say
and do to changes in their legal situation.
For over a century US scholars and jurists have been discussing the
choice between formalist and contextualist rules of exposition. At the end
of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, Holmes and
Williston each advocated plain meaning rules, which focused on the text
and its conventional meaning.2 Legal Realists like Corbin and Llewellyn
criticized that approach and advocated for rules that paid more attention to
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Stephin Merritt, The Book of Love, on The Magnetic Fields, 69 Love
Songs, Vol. 1 (1999).
2
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv.
L. Rev. 417, 420 (1899); Samuel Williston, 2 The Law of Contracts, Chapter
XXI: General Rules for the Interpretation or Construction of Contracts and
the Parol Evidence Rule, 1157-1278 (1920) (hereinafter Williston (1st ed.)).
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what the words meant in the context in which they were used.3 The
Realists’ influence can be seen in the Second Restatement,4 in the UCC,5
and in judicial opinions like Justice Traynor’s in Pacific Gas & Electric v. G.
W. Thomas Drayage Co. and Judge Friendly’s in Frigaliment Importing v.
B.N.S. International Sales,6 both of which are today part of the teaching
canon. In the United States, the last decade of the twentieth century saw the
resurgence of formalism in contract law, among both academics and jurists.
Under the banner of the “New Formalism,” scholars marshaled economic
analysis and empirical studies to argue that sophisticated parties often
preferred more formalist approaches, and that existing rules stood in their
way.7 At the same time, other scholars and jurists have continued to press
for more contextualist rules of contract exposition.8
3

See Arthur Linton Corbin, 3 Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive
Treatise on the Rules of Contract Law §§ ___-___ (1951) (hereinafter
“Corbin (1st ed.)”); Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the
Parol Evidence Rule, 50 Cornell L.Q. 161 (1965); K.N. Llewellyn, On Our
Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance I & II, 48 Yale L.J. 1 & 779
(1938); K.N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40
Yale L.J. 704 (1931).
4
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 202(1); 212 cmt. b; 214,
cmt. b (1981).
5
See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-303, 2-202, 2-208.
6
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33
(1968); Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., 190
F.Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
7
For an early example, see Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default
Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 597 (1990). For a recent
example, see Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contract
and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of
Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 170 (2013). For a good critical
overview, see David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 842 (1999).
Perhaps the best known judicial statement of the formalist position
is Kozinski’s criticism of Pacific Gas in Trident Center v. Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569–70 (9th Cir. 1988). But Judge Easterbrook
has penned his share, for example in Empro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Ball–Co Mfg.,
Inc., 870 F.2d 423 (7th Cir.1989).
8
See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract
Law, in 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 1 (2001); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of
Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1710
(1997).
For a domestic example of judicial antiformalism, see Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association v. Tribune Co., 670 F.Supp. 491, 499
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). Courts in England have recently taken a sharply
2
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“Formalism” is used with different meanings in different legal
contexts. When the subject is not the exposition of legal texts, US scholars
often use “formalism” to describe a jurisprudential temperament that prefers
rules to standards, abjures consequentialist legal reasoning in favor of
deductive systems, would limit the discretion of judges when deciding
cases, and would have legal rules operate independently of moral
considerations, customs, and other nonlegal norms.9 In discussions of legal
interpretation or exposition, the term is used more narrowly. Here
“formalism” is usually defined in one of two ways: as an interpretive
approach that limits the sorts of evidence adjudicators may consider when
determining the meaning of legal actors’ words and actions, or one that
treats meaning as relatively context independent.10 These definitions are
connected. Limiting the interpretive evidence usually means focusing on
written texts and excluding more contextual data. In practice, evidentiary
parsimony results in invariant meanings.
These generic definitions of “formalism” are fine as far as they go.
But they fail to disaggregate several ways of restricting interpretive evidence
and identifying acontextual meanings. This article distinguishes two very
different forms of formalism one finds in the law of contract. The first is the
use of legal formalities, such as “as is,” “F.O.B.,” the seal, and established
boilerplate. Formalities work only to the extent that context evidence of
meaning plays at most a secondary role in their construction. The second,
independent, way of limiting context evidence, which I call interpretive
formalism, limits the evidence decision makers may consider when they
antiformalist turn, most significantly in Investors Compensation Scheme v.
West Bromwich Building Society, [1998] 1 WLR 896; [1998] 1 All ER 98.
9
See Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607 (1999)
(describing the many meanings of “formalism”); Eric A. Posner, The Decline
of Formality in Contract Law, in The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract
61, 63-64 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (describing ways in which Holmes can
be viewed as a formalist); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended
Empirically?, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 636, 638-39 (1999) (describing the formalist
attitude).
10
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 9 at 639 (defining “interpretive formalism”
in terms of the amount of evidence considered); Avery Weiner Katz, The
Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 Colum. L.
Rev. 496, 516 (2004) (same); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
Colum. L. Rev. 799 (1941) (describing a “formal transaction” as one that is
“abstracted from the causes which gave rise to it and which has the same
legal effect no matter what the context of motives and lay practices in
which it occurs”); Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form,
Context, and Audience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1112 (2003) (treating an
expression as “formal to the extent that its meaning is invariant under
changes in context”).
3
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interpret a text, thereby giving greater weight to words’ conventional
meanings. So-called plain meaning rules are examples of interpretive
formalism. Whereas formalities obviate interpretation, interpretive
formalism constrains it.
This article does not argue for or against formalism generally, or
even for or against one type of formalism. I argue that contract law is too
complex for generic arguments of this sort. The law of contracts
encompasses a broad range of transactions—everything from an agreement
between family members concerning financial and household matters to a
long-term supply contract between multinational corporations. The law
properly applies different rules of exposition to different transaction types.11
In addition, parties’ legal situation often depends not on a single act of
agreement, but on multiple acts of different types—solicitations, requests for
modification, waivers, demands for adequate assurance, repudiations, and
so forth. One finds in the law different degrees of formalism depending on
the act at issue. Finally, the legal relations that comprise contracts are
themselves multifaceted. In addition to first-order duties to perform, a
contract might include conditions on those obligations, terms that
determine the force of a writing, terms that indicate how the parties’ words
and actions should be interpreted, limitations on how the contract can be
modified, remedial rights and obligations, and so forth. One also finds
different types of rules, some more formalist some less formalist, attaching
to different legal questions within contractual relationships.
This variety means that lawmakers do not need a single off-the-rack
design, but a theory of bespoke design solutions. They do not need generic
arguments for or against formalism, but a toolkit for deciding what types of
formalism are likely to add value when. This article provides such a theory.
Understanding when formalism works in contract law requires a clear
account of the structure of contract exposition, differentiation among
several types of formalist exposition, and an analysis of the design
considerations that speak for and against each.
This article draws both from legal theory and from the philosophy of
language. Three ideas from legal theory are especially important: the
relationship among mandatory, default and altering rules; the distinction
between interpretation and construction; and the concepts of powerconferring rules and juristic acts. Most contemporary contract theorists pay
attention only to the first. All three are necessary for an adequate
understanding of how contract exposition works. I draw on to ideas from
the philosophy of language. The first is the distinction is between what a
person says and what she believes and intends, or more technically,
between communicative content and propositional attitudes. Unlike much
public law, both can be relevant to contract exposition. The second is the
11

For more on this point, see Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Choice
Theory of Contract (2017).
4
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difference between words’ literal meaning and what they are used to mean
on a given occasion, or more technically, between semantic and pragmatic
content. Here too one finds a difference from public law, where semantic
content is typically given more weight. If these concepts are not familiar to
the reader, they will be by the end of this article. They allow me to
distinguishing and provide detailed descriptions of the two basic forms of
formalism, and to examine when lawmakers should deploy each.
Philosophers distinguish between knowing how and knowing that.12
One can know how to speak English, for example, without knowing that an
indirect object usually comes before the direct object (“I gave her it.”), but
not when preceded by a “to” (“I gave it to her.”). This article provides
something like a grammar of the rules of contract exposition. It employs
concepts that are more fine-grained than the ones courts typically use, and
describes what courts do rather than what they say. In that respect, it is
speaks in the first instance to theorists of the law, rather than users of it.
That said, many of the ideas I employ have forgotten precursors in
the classic treatises, and especially in early editions of Wigmore, Williston
and Corbin—writers who exerted an enormous influence on the
development of our law of contract and whose contributions I discuss in the
analysis below. And of course theory is not divorced from practice.
Knowing that formalist rules of contract exposition have a certain function
and structure can improve how we design and deploy them. In the course
of developing a general theory of formalism, this article provides new
accounts of some important cases and familiar topics. These include a close
reading of Justice Traynor’s opinion in Pacific Gas (section 3.2.3), a new
analysis of so-called plain meaning rules (section 2.2.3), a critical
discussion of common arguments against the very possibility of plain
meaning (section 3.2.1), and a new account of the parol evidence rule, and
especially the rules for integration (Part Four).
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part One provides
the conceptual tools necessary for the analysis. These include: the
distinction between interpretation and construction; an understanding of
the difference between mandatory rules, default rules and altering rules;
and a sharp distinction, new in the literature, between interpretive and
formalistic altering rules. Part Two uses these ideas to describe two forms of
formalism in contract law. The first involves the use of legal formalities,
which obviate interpretation altogether. The second, typified by plain
meaning rules, limits interpretive evidence and thereby gives greater weight
to the literal meaning of parties’ words. Part Three then asks when
lawmakers might want to deploy one or another form of formalism. This is
not an argument for or against formalism, but a theory of how such
arguments should be framed and the considerations they should address.
12

Most famously, Gilbert Ryle, Knowing How and Knowing That: The
Presidential Address, 46 Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y 1 (1945-46).
5
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Part Four applies the analysis to critically examine the parol evidence rule,
focusing on the rules for determining whether or not a writing is integrated.
Before jumping into the analysis, two comments, one on substance
and the other on method. First, readers who know contract law might
wonder why I do not spend more time on the distinction between
subjective and objective meaning. Although the distinction played an
outsize role in thinking about contract interpretation at the turn of the
twentieth century, I give it only a paragraph in section 2.2.1.2. The reason
is that I believe the distinction is not very salient in practice and of limited
interest in theory. It is primarily a rule for assessing relative fault when there
was an alleged miscommunication. For readers who are concerned about
the distinction, I suggest reading my unmodified uses of “meaning,”
“communicative content,” “belief,” “interpretation,” and similar concepts in
their objective senses.
Second, this article explores the rules of contract interpretation and
construction from within, taking lawmakers’ stated reasoning and rationales
largely at face value. It does not, on the whole, examine how courts
actually apply those rules or ask what hidden purposes they might serve.13
Although I am not uncritical of existing practices, I examine them from the
inside. The hope is that a clear functional analysis of the rules courts
articulate, one that clarifies both their internal logic and their empirical
presuppositions, will assist in identifying both those rules’ limits and their
misapplications. Part Four’s analysis of the parol evidence rule provides an
example.
1

Legal Exposition: Some Basic Concepts

A large portion of the law of contracts comprises rules governing
how parties’ words and actions effect changes to their legal relationship.
These include rules that govern when a contract comes into existence, such
as the rules for what constitutes an offer, acceptance, counteroffer, rejection
or agreement; rules for determining from parties’ agreement the scope of
their contractual duties, rights, privileges, powers, and so forth; rules for
contract modifications and waivers; rules for anticipatory repudiation and
adequate assurances; and rules governing the election of remedies. These
and other rules specify how parties’ words and actions can alter the legal
situation between them.
This mutability of parties’ contractual relationships is a defining
feature of contract law. Sophisticated parties have an enormous amount of
control over when contractual obligations attach, what those obligations
13

See, e.g., Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation
and Supplementation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1710 (1997) (arguing that in
practice courts do not follow the rules of interpretation and construction
they articulate).
6
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are, and the consequences of their breach. Parties even have the power to
change the rules that govern how future changes can be made. Thus an
offer can stipulate what counts as an acceptance; a no-oral-modification
clause can alter how parties can make changes to their contract; a merger
clause can limit the evidence that will go into determining the scope of the
parties’ contractual obligations. All this and more is done through
communicative acts. Usually these are linguistic acts, although sometimes
other meaningful acts or omissions suffice.
In order to avoid confusion, I use legal exposition to refer to the
process of translating persons’ words and actions into legal effects. This
article is about how legal exposition works in contract law, and about a
family of rules of contract exposition that can be broadly described as
“formalist.” But first I need to say a few words about the structure of
contract exposition more generally. Three features are foundational for the
discussion that follows.
The first is the difference between two activities that go into legal
exposition: interpretation and construction. Arthur Linton Corbin’s
description of each in the first edition of his contracts treatise remains one
of the best:
By “interpretation of language” we determine what ideas that
language induces in other persons. By “construction of the
contract,” as the term will be used here, we determine its legal
operation—its effect upon the action of courts and administrative
officials. If we make this distinction, then the construction of a
contract starts with the interpretation of its language but does not
end with it; while the process of interpretation stops wholly short of
a determination of the legal relations of the parties.14
Interpretation identifies the meaning of some words or actions, construction
their legal effect. For example, it is one thing to determine that a reasonable
person would understand an offer made over drinks as a joke, another to
determine whether such a joke created the power of acceptance.15 It is one
thing to determine whether the parties agreed to liquidate damages in a
certain amount for breach, another to determine whether that amount is a
penalty and therefore cannot be awarded.16 It is one thing to determine that
the parties adopted a writing as “a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of their agreement,” another to determine what evidence they can
therefore use to prove the terms of the contract, and how they may use it.17
In each of the examples, the first activity is interpretation, the second
14

3 Corbin (1st ed.) § 534 at 7.
See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493 (1954).
16
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 (1981).
17
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 210(1) (1981).
15
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construction. Rules of interpretation govern the identification of meaning;
rules of construction the determination of legal effect. Legal exposition, as I
am using the term, comprises interpretation and construction.
The second structural feature is the difference between mandatory
rules, default rules and altering rules, all of which are rules of construction.
A mandatory rule specifies a legal state of affairs that applies no matter
what legal actors say and do. Thus when the Second Restatement observes
that “[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement,” it says that the parties who
have entered into a contract have a duty of good faith no matter what.18 The
duty cannot be disclaimed. A default rule specifies the legal state of affairs
absent the right person’s or persons’ expression to the contrary. Familiar
examples in contract law include the rule that an offer on which the offeree
has not relied is revocable;19 the implied warranty of merchantability that
attaches to a merchant’s sale of goods;20 and most rules governing the
calculation of damages for breach.21 An altering rule specifies whose saying
of what is sufficient to effect a change from the associated default legal state
of affairs.22 Thus a merchant selling goods can make her offer irrevocable
for up to three months by expressing her intent to do so in a signed
writing;23 a seller can disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability by
using words like “as is” or “with all faults”;24 and parties can generally agree
to liquidate or limit damages for breach by expressing their shared intent to
do so.
Every default comes with an altering rule. To describe a legal state
of affairs as a default is to say that some legal actor or actors might change
it by saying the right thing in the right way. Who must say what how is
determined by an altering rule. Some altering rules specify the use of
particular words or phrases, such as “as is.” Others are more open ended.
Thus the basic formation rule under Article Two of the Uniform
18

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981). This is not to say that the
parties cannot alter the specific requirements of that obligation through
their words and actions. The point is only that they cannot escape the duty
altogether.
19
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 42 cmt. a (1981).
20
U.C.C. § 2-314(1).
21
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 346-52 (1981).
22
I take this term from Ian Ayres’s important work, Regulating Opt-Out: An
Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 Yale L.J. 2032 (2012). See also Brett
McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU
L. Rev. 383 (2007). In earlier work, I have analyzed altering rules under the
heading of “opt-out” rules. Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 Va. L. Rev.
1437 (2009).
23
U.C.C. § 2-205.
24
U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).
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Commercial Code provides that “[a] contract for sale of goods may be
made in any manner sufficient to show agreement.”25 This rule requires
only that parties express their agreement to the transaction.
Scholars often speak of default rules as “rules of interpretation,” and
commonly use terms like “default interpretations” or “interpretive
defaults.”26 But if we attend to the distinction between interpretation and
construction, it is clear that both default and altering rules are rules of
construction. A default rule says what the legal state of affairs is when the
associated altering rule is not satisfied. As Corbin observes, “[w]hen a court
is filling gaps in the terms of an agreement, with respect to matters that the
parties did not have in contemplation and as to which they had no
intention to be expressed, the judicial process . . . . may be called
‘construction’; it should not be called ‘interpretation.’”27 Similarly, altering
rules describe the legal effects of what parties say and do. As such, they too
are rules of construction.
Interpretation enters into legal exposition by way of altering rules.
Recall again Article Two’s general formation rule: “A contract for sale of
goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including
conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a
contract.”28 Determining whether the parties have agreed to a sale of goods
requires interpreting their words and conduct. The altering rule specifies
that words or actions with the right meaning will effect a legal change.
All altering rules share a tripartite structure. An altering rule provides
that if (1) the right actors (2) perform the right type of act, then (3) a
specified nondefault legal state of affairs will pertain. Article Two’s rule for
firm offers not supported by consideration provides a useful example. The
default rule for offers is that they are revocable. Or as I will say below, the
defeasible legal effect of simple offer is that the offeror has the power to
revoke. Section 2-205 provides an altering rule:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing
which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not
revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no
time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may such
period of irrevocability exceed three months.
The rule establishes (1) whose acts are relevant: those of a merchant buyer
or seller of goods; (2) what acts are sufficient to displace the default: a
25

U.C.C. § 2-204(1).
A search of Westlaw’s JLR database finds 76 articles using “default
interpretation,” 81 using “interpretive default,” and 56 using “default rule of
interpretation.” Search run on January 13, 2017.
27
3 Corbin (1st ed.) § 534 at 9.
28
U.C.C. § 2-204.
26
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signed written assurance that the offer will be held open; and (3) the term
that substitutes for the default: irrevocability for the time stated or, if no time
is stated, for a reasonable time, but in no case for more than three months.
This article focuses on the second element of altering rules: the
specification of acts sufficient to displace the default, which I will call
altering acts. I will also say a few things about legal effects.
A merchant’s section 2-205 offer must satisfy three requirements.
The offer must (a) “by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open,”
(b) be in writing, and (c) be signed. Determining whether the first
requirement is met—whether the right sort of assurance was given—
involves interpretation, even if only to ascertain the literal meaning of the
offeror’s words. Determining whether the second and third requirements
are satisfied—whether the assurance was in writing and whether it was
signed—does not involve interpretation. The first requirement is that the
offer perform an act with the right meaning, the second and third that the
act be of the right form.
These elements of section 2-205’s rule for firm offers reflect a third
structural feature of legal exposition. I will call rules that condition legal
outcomes on the meaning of what the parties say and do interpretive
components of altering rules, and rules that condition legal outcomes on
facts that can be ascertained without interpretation formal components. An
interpretive component requires interpretation of the parties’ words and
actions to determine whether they have effected a legal change. A formal
component requires examination of formal qualities of the parties’ words
and actions.
Any given altering rule might have only interpretive components,
only formal components, or a mix of the two. I will say that an altering rule
that includes only formal components is a formalistic altering rule. Consider
section 2-319 of the Code, which provides that, “when the term is F.O.B.
the place of shipment, the seller must at that place ship the goods in the
manner provided in this Article . . . and bear the expense and risk of putting
them into the possession of the carrier.” According to this rule, the letters
“F.O.B.” plus the name of a place suffice to effect the legal change. No
further inquiry into what the parties or their words meant is required. The
rule is a formalistic one. The section 2-316 rule for “as is” and “with all
faults” is similarly formalistic. It provides that, ceteris paribus, the mere use
of those words is enough to exclude all implied warranties. So too the
common law and statutory rules governing the legal effect of the seal.
I will say that an altering rule that is not formalistic is an interpretive
rule. Interpretive altering rules always contain an interpretive component.
Their application requires interpretation of the meaning of the parties’
words and actions.
An interpretive altering rule might or might not also include formal
components. Interpretive rules that also have one or more formal
components are mixed interpretive rules. The section 2-205 rule for firm

10
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offers is a mixed interpretive rule. It requires both that a merchant seller say
words with the right meaning—that the offer “by its terms gives assurances
that it will be held open”—and that those words be in the right form—“in a
signed writing.” A merchant’s offer must satisfy both the interpretive and the
formal components to be a firm offer pursuant to the rule. Pure interpretive
rules contain no formal component. Thus the Second Restatement defines
an offer as any “manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain.”29 It
does not condition the existence of an offer on any formal qualities of the
act, such as the production of a writing, a signature, or the use of certain
words. Along the same lines is the section 2-204 rule: “A contract for sale
of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a
contract.” Although other provisions in the Code add formal components
for some contract types,30 this basic formation rule is purely interpretive. All
that is necessary is that the parties’ words and conduct “show agreement”
to the exchange.
The distinction between formal and informal components therefore
produces a typology of altering rules that can be represented in a two-bytwo table.
Figure 1
Interpretive Component
Yes

No

Yes

mixed
interpretive rules
(UCC rule for firm
offers)

formalistic rules
(“as is,” “F.O.B.”)

No

pure
interpretive rules
(generic rules for
agreement)

Formal
Component

The above discussion can be summarized as follows. Much of
contract law concerns the exposition of parties’ words and action. Legal
exposition involves two separate activities: interpretation, which identifies
the meaning of the parties’ words and actions, and construction, which
identifies their legal effect. Rules of construction include mandatory, default
and altering rules. A mandatory rule says what the legal state of affairs is no
matter what the parties say or do. A default rule says what the legal state of
29
30

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1981).
Most obviously the Code’s Statute of Frauds. U.C.C. § 2-201.
11
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affairs is absent the parties’ contrary expression. An altering rule identifies
contrary expressions sufficient to effect a change from the default. Altering
rules can have interpretive and formal components. Interpretive
components condition legal change on the performance of acts with the
right meaning. Formal components condition legal change on the
performance of acts of the right form. Formalistic altering rules have only
formal components. Pure interpretive rules have only interpretive
components. Mixed interpretive rules have both formal and interpretive
components.
Conceptual distinctions and taxonomies are of value when they
shed new light on old questions. The argument for the above categories can
therefore be found in the remainder of this article. That said, here is an
example of their utility. Eric Posner has suggested that “[a]n interesting
aspect of the Statute of Frauds and other contract formalities is that they do
not fit easily into the default-immutable rule dichotomy frequently used by
contract theorists.”31 The reason is that the default-immutable rule, or
default-mandatory rule, dichotomy is incomplete. Statutes of Frauds and
other formal requirements belong to a third category: altering rules. A
writing requirement like a Statute of Frauds is not itself an altering rule, but
is sometimes a component of other altering rules. In the transactions to
which it applies, a Statute of Frauds adds a formal component to the
altering rules governing formation: the parties’ agreement must be
evidenced by a signed writing.32 Altering rules and their components, like
any other framework contract rules, can themselves be mandatory or
default. As it happens, Statutes of Frauds are mandatory components of the
altering rules into which they figure. Parties cannot contract out of their
writing requirements. Although a complete understanding of such formal
requirements demands a richer conceptual toolkit, a Statute of Frauds
therefore also fits “into the default-immutable rule dichotomy.”
2

Two Forms of Formalism

As I noted in the Introduction, scholars and jurists commonly speak
about formalist interpretation as if it were just one thing. “Formalism” is
31

Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A
Comment, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1971, 1981 (1996).
32
This is roughly the basic requirement of Article Two’s writing
requirement. U.C.C. § 2-201(1). The rule in section 2-201 of the Code
contains exceptions and qualifications that are not captured in the above.
And other Statutes of Frauds require additional things of the writing. For
example, the Second Restatement suggests that the contents of the writing
must (1) reasonably identify the subject matter of the contract; (2) indicate
that a contract has been made; and (3) state the essential terms of the
unperformed promise. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 131 (1981).
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defined either as an approach that limits the sorts of evidence that go into
interpretation or as one that treats meaning as context independent.33 The
above description of the structure of legal exposition provides the tools for a
more detailed account of the different forms of formalism one finds in the
law of contract. This Part describes two common types: formalities and
plain meaning rules.
2.1

Formalities

I have distinguished between interpretive and formal components of
altering rules. An interpretive component conditions legal change on words
or actions with the right meaning. A formal component conditions legal
change on words or actions of the right form. A formalistic altering rule has
only formal components; it conditions legal change only on the formal
properties of what the parties say and do, not on its meaning.
I will use formalities to denote altering acts that satisfy formalistic
altering rules. A formality is an act, such as the use of a specific string of
word, a symbol or a gesture, sufficient to effect legal change solely by virtue
of its formal qualities, as distinguished from its meaning. The contract
formality par excellence is the seal. There is no reason to affix a printed
wafer or to add the words “Locus Sigilli” or the letters “L.S.” at the bottom
of a written agreement except to achieve the associated legal effect. When
it was strictly applied, mere compliance with the formal requirements—a
writing signed, sealed, and delivered—was enough to create a legal
obligation. Thus Williston reported in the first edition of his treatise: “If the
forms are observed, the obligation is binding. . . . [A]t common law mutual
assent or any intention on the part of either obligor or obligee was entirely
unnecessary.”34 This description of the rule for formal contracts, however,
does not capture its function. As a formality, the seal provided a means for
individuals to realize their intent to incur a legal obligation. An interpretive
inquiry into “mutual assent or any intention on the part of either obligor or
obligee” was unnecessary because use of the formality itself so strongly
evinced the requisite intent.35
Legal formalities are familiar creatures. Ian Ayres calls them
“passwords”; Charles Goetz and Robert Scott refer to them as
“invocations”; and Karl Llewellyn terms them “formal acts.”36 In Rudolf von

33

See supra n. 10.
1 Williston (1st ed.) § 205, 412.
35
The seal is still operative in many U.S. jurisdictions, although its legal
effect has changed over time. See Eric Mills Holmes, Stature & Status of a
Promise Under Seal as a Legal Formality, 29 Willamette L. Rev. 617 (1993).
36
Ayres, supra note 22, at 2080-83; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The
Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express
and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261, 282 (1985); K.N.
34
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Ihering’s canonical explanation, “legal formalities relieve the judge of an
inquiry whether a legal transaction was intended, and—in case different
forms are fixed for different legal transactions—which was intended.”37
Formalistic altering rules achieve this by circumventing interpretation
altogether.
Although in their application formalities relieve courts from
interpreting the parties’ intent, the function of a legal formality is to provide
a cheap and effective tool with which parties can realize their intent. As Lon
Fuller observed, “form offers a legal framework into which the party may fit
his actions, or, to change the figure, it offers channels for the legally
effective expression of intention.”38 Interpretive inquiries into parties’
intentions can be uncertain and their results difficult to predict. By
rendering interpretation of the parties’ intentions unnecessary, a formalistic
altering rule gives the parties an instrument for realizing those intentions.
The seal, like the letters “F.O.B” on a contract for the sale of goods,
is a pure formality: although it has a history, it has no contemporary
meaning other than the legal one defined by the relevant altering rule.
Other formalities are constructed out of ordinary language. As already
noted, Article Two provides that “unless the circumstances indicate
otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like ‘as is’
[or] ‘with all faults.’”39 Although the rule is written as if the phrases are mere
examples, in practice it establishes these ordinary-language terms as
sufficient to achieve the relevant legal effect.40 Sophisticated parties who
encounter “as is” in a contract know that it is not being used to convey its
non-legal meaning (arguably a tautology), but is there solely to achieve a
particular legal effect.
Another salient example comes not from contract law, but the
construction of wills. James Bradley Thayer, in his 1898 evidence treatise,
described the rule for construing a bequest to the testator’s “children”:

Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704,
711 (1931).
37
Rudolf von Ihering, II Geist des Römischen Rechts 494 (8th ed. 1923)
(quoted in Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799,
801 (1941)). See also Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative
Powers (pt. 2), in 46 Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y 79, 81 (Supp. 1972)
(describing the function of legal formalities).
38
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 801
(1941).
39
U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).
40
See, e.g., Meyer v. Alex Lyon & Son Sales Managers & Auctioneers, Inc.,
889 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1st Dept. 2009) (holding that “as is” clause disclaimed
all implied warranties without further inquiry.
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Facts tending very strongly to show that the testator meant to
include the illegitimate children are generally irrelevant, because,
prima facie, the legal definition of the term children excludes
illegitimates, and therefore a contrary interpretation is not in general
legally allowable.41
In the language I have been using, at common law the legal consequences
of a bequest to one’s “children” did not require interpretation of the term.
No matter what the word’s dictionary meaning or the testator’s apparent or
actual intentions, the legal effect of word in a last will and testament was
that the bequest went only the testator’s children by marriage. The example
is interesting for three reasons. First, it is an example of a noun serving as
legal formality. “As is,” “F.O.B.” and the seal, in contrast, all stand in for
legal propositions or adverbial phrases. Second, the rule nicely illustrates
how public policy considerations—here ones that most would today find
unacceptable—can figure into the design of legal formalities. The point of
the rule was not, or not only, to get at the testator’s intent. I briefly consider
other purposes formalities can serve in section 3.1.2.
Third, the rule’s history illustrates different types of legal effects that
can attach to formalities, and to altering acts more generally. In Thayer’s
description, a bequest to one’s “children,” without further qualification
meant one’s children by marriage, no matter what else that testator said.
Using the word “children” had a mandatory legal effect—one that the
testator could not change. I will call altering acts with mandatory legal
effects nondefesaible. Wigmore, discussing the same rule, reports that in
later years “the rule seemed to form that whenever a word of relationship
was used, the law’s meaning could be overthrown when a different sense
clearly appeared from the will and when there were no persons who
corresponded exactly to the law’s meaning.”42 This suggests that later courts
treated “children” as a defeasible legal formality—one with default legal
effects. A bequest to one’s children created a presumption that the assets in
question were to go only to children by marriage, which could be defeated
by interpretive evidence of the testator’s contrary intent.
The history of the seal follows a similar path from nondefeasible to
defeasible. Williston’s description of the early use of the seal suggests it was
a nondefeasible formality. No evidence of the parties’ contrary intent would
defeat its legal effect. In fact, “one whose seal was attached to an obligation
was bound, even though the seal had been stolen and attached to the

41

James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the
Common Law 448-49 (1898).
42
John Henry Wigmore. See 5 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the
Anglo-American Law of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, § 2463, 383
(2d ed. 1924) (hereinafter “Wigmore (2d ed.)”).
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instrument without his consent.”43 Over time the effects became
increasingly defeasible. Thus by the time of the Second Restatement, the
drafters maintained that “[t]he adoption of a seal may be shown or negated
by any relevant evidence as to the intention manifested by the promisor.”44
Judicial construction can also transform ordinary boilerplate into a
legal formality.45 A court’s construction of a string of words can give them a
legal meaning very different from their everyday content. For several
centuries, the standardized language in a Lloyd’s marine insurance policy
used the following words to describe covered risks:
Touching the Adventures and Perils which we the Assurers are
contented to bear and do take upon us in this Voyage, they are, of
the Seas, Men-of-War, Fire, Enemies, Pirates, Rovers, Thieves,
Jettisons, Letters of Mart and Counter-mart, Surprisals, Takings at
Sea, Arrests, Restraints and Detainments of all Kings, Princes, and
People, of what Nation, Condition or Quality soever, Barratry of the
Master and Mariners, and of all other Perils, Losses and Misfortunes
that have or shall come to the Hurt, Detriment, or Damage of the
said Goods and Merchandises and Ship, &c., or any Part thereof.46
In his 1914 treatise, Sir Douglas Owen observed of the clause:
It is an ancient and incoherent document, occasionally the subject
of judicial remarks in the highest degree uncomplimentary. But
nobody minds this or dreams of altering the ancient form, nor, one
may imagine, is it ever likely to be altered. Insurance experts
know—or very often know—exactly what it means, and with
generations of legal interpretations hanging almost to every word,
and almost certainly to every sentence, in it, it would be highly
dangerous to tamper with it.47
43

1 Williston (1st ed.) § 205, 412.
Restatement (Second) Contracts § 98 cmt. a (1981). See also id. § 96 cmt.
b (“[A] document which bears a seal does not establish its own authenticity.
Evidence of extrinsic circumstances may be necessary to show that a
promisor affixed or adopted a seal and that the document was delivered.”);
1 Williston on Contracts § 2:2 n.11 (4th ed. 2016) (citing cases); Holmes,
supra note 35, at 636-37 (1993) (discussing the modern requirement of a
party’s intent to deliver the sealed instrument).
45
See Ayres, supra note 22, at 2082.
46
I am grateful to Jim Oldham for bringing this example to my attention.
See James C. Oldham, Insurance Litigation Involving the Zong and other
British Slave Ships, 1780-1807, 28 J. Legal Hist. 299, 300 (2007).
47
Sir Douglas Owen, Ocean Trade and Shipping 155 (1914). See also id. at
158 (“If such a contract were to be drawn up for the first time to-day, it
44
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Such standard clauses are also legal formalities. When used by
sophisticated parties, their legal meaning lies entirely in the rules of
construction that determine their legal effect. Those rules of construction
can be found in judicial opinions construing the clause to apply to various
factual constellations. So long as the proper words are used, they do not
require interpretation but only construction.
Ian Ayres suggests yet another way formalities might come into
existence. In addition to construing language in the parties’ contract, courts
might recommend words future parties can use to avoid the default. Thus
Ayres points out that although in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent Justice Cardozo
suggested parties might avoid the substantial performance rule through the
use of “apt and certain words,” Cardozo did not say what words would
suffice to achieve that legal effect. Ayres sees this a shortcoming.
Jacob & Youngs is a classic example of a court announcing a default
but failing to specify the associated altering rules. . . . Judge
Cardozo found that the parties’ attempts to displace the substantial
performance rule were insufficient, but he did not indicate what
words would be sufficient. Particularly, when a court determines
that a contractor’s attempts to displace or preserve a default were
insufficient to achieve the result advocated by the losing side in a
dispute, courts should drop a footnote identifying what language
would be sufficient or explaining why they are not providing such
language.48
Had Cardozo dropped a footnote providing, in dicta, specific words parties
might use to avoid the substantial performance rule, courts encountering
that language in subsequent cases might, in their holdings, have construed
the language to create a new legal formality.
Ayres would have judges take a more active role in the creation of
formalities than they currently do. Under existing legal practices, contract
formalities exist either by ancient custom, like the seal, by legislative fiat
perhaps building on custom, such as the UCC rules for “F.O.B.” and “as

would be put down as the work of a lunatic endowed with a private sense
of humour.”).
48
Ayres, supra note 22 at 2056. See also id. at 2055 (“In deciding
interpretation disputes, and in fact in deciding any contractual issue
concerning defaults, judges should presumptively provide in their decisions
contractual language that would allow future contractors to achieve the
results desired by the losing party. Judges should strive to tell losing parties
how they can alter future contracts to win next time.”)
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is,”49 or through the judicial construction of standard terms chosen by
parties, as in the Lloyd’s marine insurance policy. Ayres proposes a fourth
source: judicial drafting of words sufficient to contract around the default.
Whether this would be a good thing is debatable. Responding to Lisa
Bernstein’s studies of trade associations, David Charny expressed doubts:
As Bernstein reports, [trade association] tribunals frequently include
in their opinions drafts of contract terms that should be incorporated
into contracts to avoid future disputes. Note how this procedure lays
the foundation for formalism in the next round: the trade association
adjudicator can now insist that the dispute be resolved decisively by
the presence or absence of a particular term, which, for the tribunal,
has a built-in imprimatur and a preannounced meaning. In contrast,
common law courts lack the institutional machinery for this
prospective rulemaking: they are inexpert, they do not face contract
cases from any specific industry often enough to mold practice, and
they lack the means to communicate their decisions in a way that
would reach the full range of transactors.50
Whether courts should take Ayres’s advice and use their opinions to
generate new formalities depends on empirical facts about judicial
competence and party responsiveness—facts that we do not have much
hard data about.51 Here I merely note judicial innovation as a possible
fourth way.
The relationship between formalistic altering rules and the generic
senses of “formalism” should be obvious. Legal formalities work by
circumventing interpretation altogether. In order to determine the legal state
of affairs, a third-party adjudicator need look only to the use of the
formality, not at its meaning or the parties’ intent. Formalistic altering rules
can render appeal to anything other than the use vel non of the formality
unnecessary. Accordingly, they call for a minimal evidentiary base and are
largely context insensitive.

49

Of course legislative fiat may involve putting a legal imprimatur on words
already in use among responsive parties. Most formalities have histories.
50
Charny, supra note 7 at 848.
51
Though recent experience with judicial interpretations of pari passu
clauses in sovereign debt contracts suggests even sophisticated parties are
often not very responsive. In the immediate aftermath of judicial rulings on
the legal meaning of the standard clause that went against the
understanding of most lawyers in the field, those lawyers did not redraft
their standard contracts to clarify the clauses’ meaning. See Mitu Gulati &
Robert E. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and
the Limits of Contract Design 45-72 (2013).
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This is not to say extrinsic evidence cannot enter into the case.
Except in the most extremely formalistic altering rules, use of a contract
formality does not preclude the introduction of context evidence to show
duress, fraud, mistake or another invalidating cause. Many Article Two
provisions that establish formalities also provide that the parties’ might
agree to a different legal meaning—that they might alter the formalistic
altering rule.52 And defeasible formalities create only a presumption of legal
change, which might be defeated by evidence of the parties’ contrary
intent. But in all these cases the evidence is relevant to show only that the
formality has malfunctioned, has been redesigned, or is rebutted. In the first
instance, formalities support, and even demand, a high degree of
formalism.
2.2

Interpretive formalism

Contract law has its share of formalities. But they hardly dominate.
And they are almost always paired with interpretive altering rules. Words or
actions with the right meaning usually also suffice. Consider again the
Code’s rule for the implied warranty of merchantability. Section 2-316(3)(a),
provides that a seller can disclaim all implied warranties by using the
formalities “as is” or “with all faults.” But section 2-316(2) provides a
separate way to alter the default warranty: “to exclude or modify the
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it [under this section] the
language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous.” This rule has formal components. The language must
mention of “merchantability” and, if in a writing, be conspicuousness. But it
does not identify magic words sufficient to disclaim the implied warranty.
Instead the seller must make a statement with the right meaning—one that
says that the seller does not warrant merchantability. The formalistic “as is”
altering rule is paired with a mixed interpretive one. Although contract law
sometimes provides that the use of a formality is sufficient to effect a legal
change, it is rarely if ever specifies that its use is necessary to effect the
change.
Moreover, many interpretive contract altering rules have no
formalistic counterparts. There are no formalities associated with important
acts such as making an offer, accepting an offer, expressly warranting the
quality of goods, liquidating damages, waiving a condition, or committing
anticipatory breach. These legal changes can occur only when one or both
parties say or do something with the right meaning. The altering rules are
interpretive only.
This section is about interpretive altering rules. I have already
identified one sense in which an interpretive altering rule might be said to
be formal: a mixed interpretive rule includes one or more formal
52

See, e.g., UCC §§ 2-319 (describing the meaning of “F.O.B” and “F.A.S.”
“unless otherwise agreed”).
19

Klass: Contract Exposition and Formalism
components, such as writing or signature requirements. I now identify two
additional and in my view more significant senses, both of which figure into
what are commonly called plain meaning rules. They correspond to what
Wigmore called “ two great divisions of the process” of interpretation: “The
first question must always be, What is the standard of interpretation? The
second question is, In what sources is the tenor of that standard to be
ascertained?”53 The first question is what type of meaning interpretation
seeks to identify; the second what evidence the interpreter may use when
determining it. After discussing each, I describe how plain meaning rules
include elements of both.
2.2.1

Literal meaning formalism

An interpretive altering rule requires that one or both parties say or
do something with the right meaning. But the word “meaning” itself has
multiple meanings. People interpret the meanings of novels, poems,
metaphors, dreams, a moment of silence, a slip of the tongue, a glance
across the room, a fall in the stock market, tea leaves in the bottom of a
cup, and of course the words and actions of parties who might or might not
have entered into a contract. Although these interpretive activities share
family resemblances, they involve very different types of inquiries, which
seek out very different sorts of meanings. An interpretive altering rule must
identify the type of meaning that is legally relevant.
Even within contract interpretation one finds a variety of legally
relevant meanings of “meaning.” Contract law does not have a single,
master altering rule, but contains a collection of rules, many tailored to the
type of transaction, to who the parties are, to the type of act, and to the
legal question at issue. Different altering rules within contract law call for
different types of interpretation of different sorts of meaning.54 Here I focus
on three central distinctions: between communicative content and
propositional attitudes; between literal meaning and use meaning; and
between common literal meaning and local literal meaning.

53

5 Wigmore (2d ed.) § 2458, 367.
Lawrence Solum has argued that “the determination of communicative
content proceeds differently in different legal contexts,” but focuses
primarily on differences between broad areas of law—constitutional law,
statutory law, the application of judicial precedent, contract law, etc.
Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 479, 482 (2013). As distinguished from the intermural
differences that Solum emphasizes, I am pointing to intramural differences
within the law of contract.

54
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2.2.1.1 Communicative content and propositional attitudes
Many contract altering rules require an agreement between or
among the parties. Examples include the rules for formation, modification,
substituted performance, and accord and satisfaction. Other contract
altering rules provide that a unilateral act can suffice to change the parties’
legal relationship. These include the rules for offer, acceptance, waiver of a
condition, repudiation, and demands for adequate assurance. To keep
things simple, this section begins by focusing on agreement-based altering
rules. But its conclusions apply equally to altering rules that identify
unilateral acts as sufficient to effect a legal change.
“Agreement” is yet another ambiguous word. In our everyday talk,
we sometimes use it to refer to the words people use to reach an accord, as
in, “The parties each signed the agreement.” At other times we use it to
refer to the mental states of being in accord, as in, “Two men, who pull the
oars of a boat, do it by agreement or convention, tho’ they have never given
promises to each other.”55 Agreements in the former sense, which I will call
acts of agreement, usually take the form of communicative acts, such as an
offer followed by an acceptance. Agreements in the latter sense, which I
will call actual agreements, are sets of interlocking beliefs and intentions, or
what philosophers call “propositional attitudes,”56 that two or more persons
have about what each shall do.57 Acts of agreement are communications
and have communicative content; actual agreements are states of mind and
involve propositional attitudes.
The two meanings of “agreement” are closely related. People
typically arrive at an actual agreement by performing acts of agreement.
They use words to achieve the shared intentions and beliefs that put them
in agreement: “Shall we go?” “Yes, Let’s go.” “Good. We’re in agreement.”
And for third-party adjudicators, parties’ acts of agreement are usually the
best evidence both of whether they have reached an actual agreement and
of its terms.
But the two types of agreement are not coextensive. An actual
agreement can sometimes exist, for example, even when one side does not
express her agreement to it. Thus courts have held that when a seller has a
history of fulfilling a buyer’s orders without further communication, an
order from the buyer together with the seller’s silence might cause both to
reasonably understand that the seller has accepted the order and shipment
55

David Hume, Of Morals, in A Treatise on Human Nature 291, 315 (David
Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1739-1740).
56
A propositional attitude is, roughly speaking, a mental state that can be
expressed with a verb that takes a that-clause, such as “believes that…”,
“intends that…”, “wishes that…”
57
For more on the relationship between agreements and the parties’
intentions, see Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, in Faces of
Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency 93 (1999).
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is forthcoming.58 The parties are in actual agreement, though one of them
has not performed an act of agreement. The content of the parties’ actual
agreement can also extend beyond their acts of agreement. This can
happen, for example, when the parties’ shared understanding of their
agreement comes from past dealings between them, from common industry
practices, and as time passes from the course of performance of the
agreement itself. Thus courts have also recognized that a seller and buyer
who have an established practice of setting the price according to the
seller’s profits on resale might, in their act of agreement to a new
transaction, say nothing about the price, yet be in agreement on how the
buyer will be paid.59 Here the actual agreement is richer than what is said
in the act of agreement.
The distinction between acts of agreement and actual agreements
corresponds to two types of interpretation one finds in contract cases:
interpretation of what the parties said and interpretation of what the parties
believed or intended.60 The first aims to discern the communicative content
of the parties’ words and action; the second to discern the parties’ legally
relevant propositional attitudes—their beliefs and intentions. The two
inquiries are related. What the parties intend and believe—whether they
are, for example, in actual agreement—turns in part on the communicative
content of their words and actions. And, as I discuss below, interpreting the
meaning of what the parties have said sometimes involves asking what they
intended to say. But the inquiries pose different questions, and the answers
to those questions involve different types of reasoning and evidence.
An altering rule might look either to communicative content of what
the parties say or to the parties’ beliefs and intentions. Again Wigmore
anticipates the point: “The distinction between ‘intention’ and ‘meaning’ is
vital,” and “[t]he rules for the two things may be different.”61 As an
example, consider the very different rules that apply to two types of
58

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69 ill. 5 (1981) (based on
Ammons v. Wilson, 176 Miss. 645 (1936)).
59
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 223 ill. 1 (1981) (based on
California Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co., 45 Cal.2d 474, 289
P.2d 785 (1955)).
60
For more on this distinction, see the discussion of “manifest intent” and
“express statement” opt-out rules in Klass, Intent to Contract, supra note 22.
61
5 Wigmore (2d ed.) § 2459, 369, 370. Wigmore’s distinction is not
identical to the one I will be drawing, as Wigmore is especially interested in
the mental state of intending the act, whereas I am interested in parties’
intentions and understandings more generally. Thus for Wigmore, “[t]he
contrast is between the Will, or volition to utter, which, as the intuitive
element of an act, makes a person responsible for a particular utterance of
his, and that Sense or meaning which involves the fixed association
between the uttered word and some external object.” Id. at 369-70.
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unilateral acts: waiver of a condition and revival of a debt discharged in
bankruptcy.62
Although the Second Restatement describes a waiver as a “promise
to perform . . . in spite of the nonoccurrence of the condition,”63 in practice
all a party must do to waive a condition is to manifest an intention to
perform despite the condition’s nonoccurrence. Thus the current edition of
Williston observes that a waiver can be found based solely on “a party’s
conduct inconsistent with the assertion of the right to the performance
allegedly waived, or by conduct that indicates that strict compliance with
the contract will not be required.”64 Whether a party has waived a
condition turns not, or not only, on what she said, but on what she
appeared to intend with respect to her own performance. In Tenneco v.
Enterprise Products, for example, the Texas Supreme Court considered
whether a co-owner of a natural gas processing plant violated its
contractual obligations to the other owners by transferring its interest to a
subsidiary and then failing to provide contractually required raw
materials.65 The court held that the nonbreaching owners’ failure to
complain about the noncompliance for over three years, together with their
apparent acceptance of the subsidiary as a co-owner, effectively waived
their rights to pursue remedies for the breach. “Silence or inaction, for so
long a period as to show an intention to yield the known right, is . . .
enough to prove waiver” of a contractual right.66 The inquiry here did not
involve the meaning of what the other owners said, but rather the
reasonable interpretation of their actual intentions with respect to enforcing
their contractual rights. The rule is not about communicative content, but
the waiving party’s apparent beliefs and intentions.

62

Another excellent example of the difference can be found in the different
rules for preliminary agreements adopted by Judge Leval in Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association v. Tribune Co., 670 F.Supp. 491
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), and Judge Easterbrook in Empro Manufacturing Co., Inc v.
Ball–Co Manufacturing, Inc., 870 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1989). Leval adopts
what I am calling an actual agreement rule, whereas Easterbrook would
look exclusively to the parties’ acts of agreements. See Klass, Intent to
Contract, supra note 22 at 1480-88 (discussing Teachers Insurance and
Empro).
63
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 84(1) (1981) (emphasis added).
64
13 Williston on Contracts § 39:30 (4th ed.). See also Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 84(1) cmt. e (1981) (“It is immaterial how the
promisor manifests his intention to fulfill the prior duty without the
performance of the condition. Words of promise or waiver, though often
used, are unnecessary; in many situations non-verbal conduct is enough.”).
65
Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Products Co., 925 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1996).
66
Id. 643.
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The old rule for reviving a debt discharged in bankruptcy, on the
contrary, required that the debtor expressly promise that she would pay the
debt. A debt discharged in bankruptcy could be revived without
consideration only by the debtor’s “express promise to pay all or part” of
it.67 Thus in Service Finance Company of Baton Rouge v. Diagle, a
Louisiana appellate court held that three payments on a debt subsequent to
its discharge, plus the debtor’s statement “that he was going to continue to
pay this account,” were insufficient to revive a discharged debt.68
In order to revive a liability on a debt discharged in bankruptcy or
to create a new enforceable obligation, there must be an express
promise to pay the specific debt, made to the creditor or his agent,
and while no particular form of language is necessary, to constitute
such a new promise there must be a clear, distinct, and unequivocal
recognition and renewal of the debt as a binding obligation,
anything short thereof being insufficient, as, for example, the mere
acknowledgment of the discharged debt, or the expression of hope,
desire, expectation, or intention to pay or revive the same.69
As I will explain shortly, this is a literal meaning altering rule. It requires
courts to look to the literal meaning of the debtor’s words. The present
point, however, is simply that it looks to the meaning of the debtor’s words,
not to the debtor’s apparent intentions.
2.2.1.2 Literal meaning and use meaning
A second important distinction lies is among types of
communicative content. This is the distinction between a speech act’s
literal meaning and its use meaning, or what philosophers and linguists
sometimes call “semantic meaning” and “pragmatic meaning.” Describing
each requires a brief detour through the philosophy of language.
As I will use the terms, the literal meaning, or semantic meaning, of
a word or string of words is its conventional meaning in some language L.
The conventional meaning of a sentence S is, roughly, determined by (1)
the conventional meaning in some language L of S’s component parts, (2)
the rules of syntax in L, and sometimes (3) conventional rules for how the
context of S’s use can figure into its meaning on the occasion of its use. The
first two aspects of literal meaning—dictionary definitions of words and the
67

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 83 (1981). For changes
introduced by the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act and subsequent legislation,
see 4 Williston on Contracts § 8:21 (4th ed. 2016).
68
Serv. Fin. Co. of Baton Rouge v. Daigle, 342 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (La. Ct.
App. 1977).
69
Id. (quoting Irwin v. Hunnewell, 207 La. 422, 435, 21 So.2d 485, 489
(1945)).
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rules of syntax—are familiar. The third element is illustrated by indexicals
such as the word “here.” The literal meaning of the sentence “It is cold in
here,” for example, turns on the rule that “here” refers to the speaker’s
location.
Paul Grice suggests an example that illustrates several important
aspects of literal meaning and also the difference between literal and use
meaning. Consider an utterance of the following sentence:
S

If I shall then be helping the grass grow, I shall have no time
for reading.70

There are several things to notice about the literal meaning of S on one or
another occasion of its use.
First, although Grice does no mention it, the indexical “I” in S
illustrates how literal meaning of a word can depend on the context of its
use. What “I” refers to in any given use of S depends on the identity of the
speaker. There is an aspect of literal meaning as I have defined it, as there is
a purely conventional rule for determining the reference of “I”: it refers to
the speaker.
Second, Grice puckishly observes that S’s literal meaning in
contemporary English is ambiguous, as “grass” refers both to the stuff of
which lawns are composed and to marijuana. Standing alone S has two
possible literal meanings:
LM1

If I shall then be assisting the kind of thing of which lawns
are composed to mature, I shall have no time for reading,

LM2

If I shall then be assisting the marijuana to mature, I shall
have no time for reading.71

and

Words can have more than one literal meaning. They can be ambiguous.
Third, although this was not Grice’s point, the example also
illustrates that words have literal meanings only in one or another language
or dialect. In 1969, when Grice’ article was published, S was ambiguous in
the way he identified. The conventional meanings of “grass” included both
the stuff of which laws are composed and marijuana. But one can easily
imagine English dialects—say before the widespread familiarity with
marijuana—in which “grass” means only the stuff of which lawns are

70

Paul Grice, Utterers Meaning and Intentions, 78 Phil. Rev. 147 (1969),
reprinted in Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words 86, 88 (1989).
71
Id. at 89.
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composed, and in which S has only one literal meaning.72 To identify literal
meaning, you need to first identify the relevant language.
Fourth, on any given occasion, a speaker or writer might use an
ambiguous sentence like S to express one or another of its literal meanings.
A busy greenskeeper who utters S in response to an invitation to join a book
club is likely using it to communicate LM1. A busy grow house employee
who utters S in response to the same invitation is likely using it to
communicate LM2. In each case, the use meaning corresponds to one of S’s
literal meanings. In order to determine which literal meaning is meant—in
order to disambiguate S—one must sometimes look to the circumstances of
its use.
Grice further observes that a speaker might also use S to
communicate something other than its literal meaning. Suppose Gertrude
Stein writes S in an essay on the banality of journalism. In this context, it
might make sense to interpret her words as meaning:
UM

If I am then dead I shall not care what is going on in the
world.73

Assuming that “helping the grass grow” is not an established idiom for
being deceased, Stein’s metaphorical meaning on this occasion does not
correspond to any of S’s literal meanings, although it depends on LM1.
Stein is using S to say something entirely different. Her use meaning departs
from the sentence’s literal meanings.
Here we might pause to distinguish three very different functions
that the context of S’s use serves in these examples: (1) to determine the
referent of “I”; (2) to identify which of two literal meanings makes sense in
that context; and (3) to show that a speaker meant something other than the
literal meaning of her words. The first depends entirely on the conventions
that govern the meaning of “I.” The second brings us closer to the
interpretation of use meaning, but involves merely the choice between
literal meanings. The third requires going beyond literal meaning
altogether.
If literal meaning is conventional meaning in some language, how
should we describe use meaning? Theorists have suggested various

72

As recently as 1943 Time Magazine felt the need to explain to its readers
that “grass” is sometimes used to refer to marijuana. The Weed, Time
Magazine 54 (July 19, 1943) (“Marijuana may be called muggles, mooter,
Mary Warner, Mary Jane, Indian hay, loco weed, love weed, bambalacha,
mohlasky, mu, moocah, grass, tea or blue sage.”). The Oxford English
Dictionary does not identify any earlier print evidence of this meaning.
73
Compare Grice, supra note 70 at 89-90.
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accounts.74 Here I rely on Grice’s theory, which is both foundational and
relatively accessible.75
Grice argues that an utterance’s use meaning, or its pragmatic
meaning, depends on the communicative intentions it is reasonable to
attribute to the speaker in the circumstances. Kent Bach and Robert
Harnish, who follow Grice in this respect, describe the interpretation of use
meaning as follows:
The hearer . . . seeks to identify the speaker’s intention in making
the utterance. In effect the hearer seeks to explain the fact that the
speaker said what he said, in the way he said it. Because the
intention is communicative, the hearer’s task of identifying it is
driven partly by the assumption that the speaker intends him to do
this. The speaker succeeds in communicating if the hearer identifies
his intention in this way, for communicative intentions are
intentions whose “fulfillment consists in their recognition.”
Pragmatics is concerned with whatever information is relevant, over
and above the linguistic properties of a sentence, to understanding
its utterance.76

74

Robyn Carston identifies five separate ways scholars have tried to draw
the distinction between semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning.
Linguistic Communication and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction, 165
Synthese 321, ___ (2008). See also Börjesson, Kristin, The SemanticsPragmatics Controversy (2014); Kent Bach, The Semantics/Pragmatic
Distinction: What It Is and Why It Matters, Linguistische Berichte,
Sonderheft 8, 33 (1997).
75
See especially H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in The Logic Of
Grammar 64 (Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman eds., 1975), reprinted in
Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words 22 (1989).
I believe that a more complete and perspicuous account of
pragmatic meaning can be found in Robert Brandom’s theory of discursive
commitments. Robert Brandom, Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing
and Discursive Commitment (1998). Brandom’s account has the advantage
of starting not from an unanalyzed concept of intention, but from precisely
defined, if unfamiliar, concepts of social practices such as deonitic status
and scorekeeping. It has the disadvantage of being highly technical and
relatively inaccessible. For a more approachable account that builds on
Bradom’s work, and ties use meaning directly to the legally salient category
of normative powers, see Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance, ‘Yo!’ and ‘Lo!’:
The Pragmatic Topography of the Space of Reasons (2009).
76
Kent Bach & Robert M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech
Acts 15 (1979).
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Grice argues that we attribute communicative intentions on the assumption
that speakers seek to comply with a Cooperative Principle: “Make your
conversational contribution such as is required at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which
you are engaged.”77 Thus in the context of a greenskeeper’s conversation
about whether she might join a book club, it is reasonable to interpret her
utterance of S as expressing LM1 rather than LM2. In an essay by Gertrude
Stein about journalism, in which neither lawns nor marijuana is at issue, it
would be more reasonable to interpret her as intending the metaphorical
meaning UM. Whereas a sentence’s literal meaning in a language is
conventionally defined, the use meaning of an utterance of it depends on
the communicative intentions it is reasonable to attribute to the speaker.
Because people can express and exhibit such intentions in nonconventional
ways, use meaning does not always correspond to literal meaning.
Contracts casebooks are filled with examples of the distinction
between literal and use meaning. Although contracting parties rarely speak
in metaphor, they often speak elliptically, with malapropisms, ironically or
with hyperbole. In Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., for
example, the question was the legal effect of a company president’s
statement to an employee, who was threatening to quit if not given a new
contract, “Go ahead, you’re all right; get your men out and don’t let that
worry you.”78 The words’ literal meaning was that the employee should get
back to work and not worry about the contract. The court found, however,
that in context “no reasonable man would construe that answer to Embry’s
demand that he be employed for another year, otherwise than as an assent
to the demand.”79 The use meaning of the manager’s words departed from
their literal meaning. The interpretation of use meaning can also be
necessary to identify humor, irony or puffery. Leonard v. Pepsico,
considered a television advertisement showing various items that could be
purchased with promotional “Pepsi Points,” including a Harrier Jet with the
words, “HARRIER FIGHTER 7,000,000 PEPSI POINTS.”80 Here the court
held that in the context of the advertisement, which employed “zany
humor,” “no reasonable, objective person would have understood the
commercial to be an offer.”81 Again, the words’ use meaning departed from
their literal meaning.
Literal meaning rules are rare in contract law, with plain meaning
rules—discussed below—being more common. But they do exist. The old
rule for reviving a debt discharged in bankruptcy, which required “an
77

Grice, supra note 75 at 26.
127 Mo. App. 383, 105 S.W. 777, 777 (1907).
79
Id. at 779.
80
88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
2000).
81
Id. at 131.
78
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express promise to pay,” is an example. So too is Williston’s Model Written
Obligation Act: “A written release or promise . . . shall not be invalid or
unenforceable for lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an
additional express statement, in any form of language, that the signer
intends to be legally bound.”82 Such express statement requirements tell
adjudicators to look to the literal meaning of the parties’ words.
So far I have identified two differences among the types of
interpretation that figure into contract cases. The first is between
interpretation that seeks out the meaning of acts of agreement and
interpretation that seeks out the beliefs and intentions that constitute actual
agreements, or more generally, the distinction between communicative
content and propositional attitudes. The second is within the interpretation
of communicative content, and is the difference between interpreting the
literal meaning of the parties’ words and actions and interpreting their use
meaning, or between what philosophers call semantic and pragmatic
meaning. Neither of these distinctions should be confused with lawyerly
distinction between subjective and objective meaning. In contracts
jurisprudence, subjective meaning refers to one or more party’s individual,
perhaps idiosyncratic, and probably undisclosed understandings of the
parties’ words and actions, whereas objective meaning refers to those
words’ or actions’ publically available meaning, or what a reasonable
person standing in a party’s shoes would understand them to mean. Literal
meaning is always objective in this sense. The conventional meaning of
words in some language is a fact about the social world. Both the parties’
actual agreement and the use meaning of their words and actions, in
distinction, can be understood either subjectively or objectively.83 Although
the parties’ actual beliefs and intentions are subjective facts, the beliefs and
intentions it is reasonable to attribute them in the circumstances is an
objective one. Altering rules that condition legal change on the parties’
actual agreement or the use meaning of their words and actions can
therefore be as objective as those that condition legal change on their literal
meaning. This was the holding in Embry, discussed above: “[T]hough
McKittrick may not have intended to employ Embry by what transpired
between them . . ., yet if what McKittrick said would have been taken by a
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Model Written Obligations Act § 1, in Handbook of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of
the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting 584 (1925).
83
In his contracts opinions, Judge Easterbrook sometimes wrongly suggests
that the objective theory entails a literal meaning approach. See, e.g.,
Empro Manufacturing Co., Inc v. Ball–Co Manufacturing, Inc., 870 F.2d
423, 424-25 (8th Cir. 1989); Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810,
814-17 (7th Cir.1987).
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reasonable man to be an employment, and Embry so understood it, it
constituted a valid contract of employment.” 84
The potential relevance of pragmatic meaning and the parties’
beliefs and intentions to the exposition of contractual agreements
distinguishes contract interpretation from the interpretation of public laws.
Many of the reasons for construing constitutions, statutes, regulations,
judicial opinions and other expressions of public law according to their
semantic meanings do not apply to written contracts. First, public laws,
unlike most contracts, are addressed to the public at large and to persons
far in the future, for whom semantic meaning is the more effective method
of communication.85 Many contractual agreements, on the contrary, are
communications between two parties and take place against a shared
background understanding. Second, there exist structural-institutional
reasons for focusing on a statute’s semantic meaning that do not apply in
the construction of contractual agreements. Some have argued, for example
“that a restrained use of legislative history and focus on the text is necessary
to prevent judicial usurpation of legislative power.”86 Although it sometimes
makes sense to think of contracts between sophisticated parties as a form of
private legislation, contracts do not raise the same separation-of-powers
issues. Third, contract law takes account of interests that have no analog in
the enforcement of public laws. These include both the parties’ autonomy
interest in controlling their legal relationship and the social interest in
having the parties’ legal obligations track their moral ones. A contracting
party whose words are legally interpreted in a way neither party anticipated
given the context in which she was speaking suffers a type of wrong that a
legislator cannot suffer.
None of this is to say that use meaning and the parties’ actual
beliefs and intentions should always control. But the arguments for
attending to use meaning and the parties’ actual agreement are different
and potentially more compelling in contract than elsewhere.
2.2.1.3 Common meaning vs. local meaning
The third and final important distinction identifies a difference
among literal meanings. The literal meaning of a speech act is its
conventional meaning in some language. As the example of “grass” shows,
words often have different conventional meanings in different languages or
84

105 S.W. at 779.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621,
667 (1990) (“By focusing on the literal meaning a statute would have for the
ordinary, reasonable reader, the new textualism has the intuitive appeal of
looking at the most concrete evidence of legislative expectations and at the
material most accessible to the citizenry. The statutory text is what one
thinks of when someone asks what the ‘law’ requires.”).
86
Id. at 648.
85
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dialects. A completely articulated literal meaning altering rule therefore
specifies not only that the conventional meaning of the parties’ words and
actions controls, but also what language the interpreter should use to
determine their conventional meaning.
Contract law has long recognized that parties sometimes speak in
languages that that diverge from dictionary English. Thus Wigmore
distinguishes between “the standard of the community, or popular standard,
meaning the common and normal sense of words; [and] the local standard,
including the special usages of a religious sect, a body of traders, an alien
population, or a local dialect.”87 I will call literal meaning in ordinary
dictionary English common meaning and literal meaning in more localized
dialects local meaning. In the Uniform Commercial Code, the idea of local
meaning falls under heading of usage of trade. “The language used is to be
interpreted as meaning what it may fairly be expected to mean to parties
involved in the particular commercial transaction in a given locality or in a
given vocation of trade.”88
Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have suggested that there are only
two possible answers to the which-language question: “majority talk” or
“the parties’ private language.”89 Wigmore’s more nuanced position shows
87

5 Wigmore (2d ed.) § 2460, 372 (emphasis in the original). Williston
quotes the same from the first edition of Wigmore, 2 Williston (1st ed.) §
604, 1162. But whereas Wigmore understands the local standard as a form
of, in my idiom, literal meaning, see 5 Wigmore (2d ed.) § 2458, 367,
Williston tends to run it together with use meaning. Thus Williston
describes the “local standard” as “the natural meaning of the writing to the
parties of the kind who contracted at the time and place where the contract
was made , and with such circumstances as surrounded its making.” 2
Williston (1st ed.) § 607, 1167 (emphasis added).
Wigmore identifies two additional categories of meaning: “the
mutual standard, covering those meanings which are peculiar to both or all
the parties to a transaction, but shared in common by them; and the
individual standard of one party to an act, as different from that of the other
party or parties, if any.” Id. These would appear to be forms of use
meaning, though Wigmore did not have the conceptual tools to identify
them as such.
88
U.C.C. 1-303 cmt. 3. The Code’s definition of “usage of trade” includes
much more than local literal meanings. “A ‘usage of trade’ is any practice
or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place,
vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with
respect to the transaction in question.” Id. § 1-303(c). Under this definition,
usages of trade include not only linguistic conventions, but also
transactional ones.
89
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 584 (2003) (“The issue is whether, if the
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that the suggestion is wrong. Literal meaning altering rules can specify
languages that are more or less local, both of which are to be distinguished
from altering rules that specify use meaning—which appears to be what
Schwartz and Scott mean by “the parties’ private language.” Williston, in
formulating his plain meaning rule for written agreements, argued that
“[t]he local standard is preferable to the normal [i.e., common] standard.”
[A] reasonable degree of certainty is attained if words are construed
according to a standard not peculiar to the parties, but customary
among persons of their kind under the existing circumstances. The
certainty obtained by enforcing always the normal standard would
be but little greater, and would be obtained at the expense of a
rigidity which would frequently do violence to the actual intention
of the parties. That the local standard would be applied unless at
any rate under the normal standard the words were extremely clear
seems to have been early settled. Even though the local standard led
to a construction opposed to the literal meaning of the language this
was true.90
In the same section, however, Williston recognizes that “in case of deeds of
conveyance, or of negotiable instruments, which are relied upon not simply
by the parties to them, but by others, the normal rather than the local
standard may be defensible.”91 Whether a literal meaning rule should use a
common or a local standard cannot be decided a priori. It is a design
choice that should be made on the basis of the legal goals and salient
empirical facts. Williston again: “The standard of interpretation adopted by
the law depends on the character of the contract under consideration.”92
*

*

*

These three distinctions suggest the following classification of
possible legally relevant meanings of “meaning” in contract cases:
contract is silent on the matter, a court should take the parties to have
written in majority talk. The alternative judicial assumption would hold
that, in case of a dispute, the parties prefer to have the opportunity to
introduce extrinsic evidence that relevant parts of the contract were written
in the parties' private language.”). By “majority talk,” Schwartz and Scott
mean a rule “that restricts the court to the interpretive base Bmin,, id. at 585,
which they define as “the parties’ contract, a narrative concerning whether
the parties performed the obligations that the contract appears to require, a
standard English language dictionary, and the interpreter’s experience and
understanding of the world,” id. at 572.
90
2 Williston (1st ed) § 608, 1171-72.
91
Id. at 1172.
92
Id., § 604, 1162.
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Figure 2
Relevant Types of Meaning
in Contract Law

Communicative Content
(e.g, acts of agreement)

Literal Meaning
(linguistic conventions)

Common Meaning
(dictionary definitions)

Beliefs and Intentions
(e.g., actual agreements)

Use Meaning
(speaker intentions)

Local Meaning
(local dialects)

The further the desired outcome of interpretation is to the left on the tree,
the less that meaning will vary across contexts and the less context
evidence will be required to determine what it is. In other words,
interpretive altering rules that condition legal outcomes on meanings to the
left can be said to be more formalist than are rules that condition legal
outcomes on meanings to the right. These distinctions are not exhaustive.
We might further complicate it by adding the distinction between
subjective and objective meanings, as well as the role that purpose plays in
contract exposition. But this basic classification corresponds to significant
fault lines among legally relevant types of meaning.
Before moving on to evidentiary rules, it is worth taking a few
paragraphs to think about the relationship between literal meaning altering
rules and legal formalities.
First, it is a mistake to run the two together. Literal-meaning altering
rules condition legal change on the conventional meaning of the parties’
words. Formalistic altering rules condition legal change on the performance
of an act with the right formal qualities, which might include saying specific
words. Whereas literal meaning rules require interpretation, formalities
render it unnecessary.
Second, literal meaning and formalistic altering rules stand in a
complex relation to one another. On the one hand, the application of a
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literal-meaning rule might generate a new legal formality. U.S. courts tend
to treat the literal meaning of contractual agreements as a question of law,
with the result that one court’s interpretation of a clause in one agreement
will often be taken as binding by subsequent courts interpreting the same
language in another. A literal-meaning altering rule together with principles
of stare decisis can thereby create a boilerplate formality where none
existed before. On the other hand, the legal meaning of a formality might
be, or might come to be, at odds with the words’ literal meaning. Recall the
Lloyd’s insurance policy quoted above. Michele Boardman observes the
same phenomenon in contemporary insurance contracts. Their standard
clauses, she argues, are best understood as “a private conversation between
drafters and the courts,” one that consumers who rely on the written
contract’s literal meaning are likely to misunderstand.93 Through the
accretion of judicial construction, boilerplate can acquire a legal meaning
that bears little resemblance to its literal meaning in ordinary English.
Although literal meaning altering rules can produce legal formalities,
formalistic altering rules can attach legal consequences to words that are at
odds with their literal meaning.
Finally, literal meaning and formalistic altering rules support
different degrees of formalism. The output of each depends less on context
than does the interpretation of use meaning or of the parties’ actual beliefs
and intentions. But unlike some formalistic altering rules, literal meaning
rules never render context evidence irrelevant. Although words’
conventional meaning can be demonstrated without looking to their use
meaning on a given occasion, how parties conversant in the relevant
language in fact understood those words is evidence of their conventional
meaning in it. If you do not know the language, evidence of how parties
understood words in it can tell you something about those words’
conventional meaning. Local literal meaning altering rules often call for
extratextual evidence of local usage. And context evidence can help to
resolve ambiguities in literal meaning, as illustrated by the multiple
meanings of “grass” in S above. In short, whereas a formality can render
context evidence irrelevant, a literal meaning rule renders it only less
relevant as compared to a use meaning rule or actual agreement rule.
2.2.2

Evidentiary formalism

The second aspect of interpretive formalism involves not the type of
meaning legal interpreters are instructed to seek, but the evidence they are
permitted use to identify one or another meaning—what Wigmore calls the
“sources” of interpretation.

93

Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1105, 1105 (2006).
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One can think of a rule of interpretation as a function that maps a
domain of interpretive inputs onto a range of interpretive outputs.94 The
inputs always include the direct object of interpretation: the text, spoken
words, gesture, or other act or omission whose meaning is at issue. The
inputs also always include the interpreter’s exegetic abilities and
background knowledge of the world. Depending on the goal of
interpretation—the type of meaning sought—and governing legal rules,
interpretive inputs might additionally include dictionary definitions and
rules of grammar, information about who the parties are and the
commercial setting of the transaction, evidence of local linguistic practices,
other communications among or by the parties, the parties’ earlier or
subsequent dealings with one another, and other relevant circumstances
surrounding the production and the parties’ understanding of the
interpretive object. The interpretive output is a meaning associated with the
interpretive object—which might be the literal meaning of those words in
some language or dialect, their use meaning, or the parties’ legally relevant
beliefs and intentions. In legal interpretation, the interpretive output serves
as input for legal construction, or the determination of legal effects. The
process of applying an interpretive altering rule can therefore be
represented as follows:
Figure 3
(inputs)
-

Interpretive object
Interpreter’ background
Dictionary
Negotiations
Course of performance
Course of dealings
…

(output / input)
Interpretation

Construction

Meaning of
interpretive object

Legal effect

What inputs should go into contract interpretation? Scholars have
mounted general defenses of both textualist and contextualist approaches.
But the choice of interpretive inputs is not a binary one. Any given rule of
94

The indeterminacy of interpretation renders the analogy is imperfect. See
Donald Davison, Radical Interpretation and Belief and the Basis of
Meaning, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 125 & 141 (1984).
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interpretation can permit more or less evidence depending on the types of
evidence it authorizes (a rule of contract interpretation might permit, for
example, usage of trade but not course of performance), on when that
evidence is allowed in (always, only when the literal meaning is
ambiguous, only in informal or nonintegrated communications, etc.), on
who may consider the evidence (only the judge, also the jury), and so forth.
The question is not simply whether or not to limit the interpretive domain to
the text and a dictionary, but how much evidence of what type to allow
under what circumstances, where the possible answers include “None
ever,” “All always,” and many points between.95
I will use the terms thick and thin to describe the relative quantity of
inputs a legal rule of interpretation permits. Rules of interpretation that
permit more interpretive inputs are thicker, those that permit fewer
interpretive inputs are thinner. Textualist rules of interpretation are at the far
thin end of the spectrum. Schwartz and Scott suggest that the minimum
interpretive domain here includes only “the parties’ contract, a narrative
concerning whether the parties performed the obligations that the contract
appears to require, a standard English language dictionary, and the
interpreter’s experience and understanding of the world.”96 Fully
contextualist approaches lie at the thicker end of the spectrum. Here the
interpretive inputs might also include “(1) the parties’ practice under prior
agreements; (2) the parties’ practice under the current agreement;
(3) testimony as to what was said during the negotiations; (4) written
precontractual documents (memoranda, prior drafts, letters); and
(5) industry custom relevant to determining what the agreement’s words
meant to the contracting parties.”97
The choice among thicker and thinner forms of interpretation is
related to, but distinct from, the choice between, on the one side, literal
meaning and, on the other, use meaning or actual agreement. The
connection should be obvious. Because an utterance’s literal meaning is its
95

See Smith, supra note 10 at 1157-66 (identifying ways that rules can be
designed to achieve a “differential formalism”); Katz, supra note 10 at 51519 (observing several ways in which courts can permit more or less
evidence in interpretation).
96
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 89 at 572.
97
Id. Schwartz and Scott’s lists are not exhaustive. Thus the current edition
of Williston maintains that even when a writing is integrated the interpreter
should consider surrounding circumstance such as “the commercial or
other setting in which the contract was negotiated and other objectively
determinable factors that give a context to the transaction between the
parties,” including “whether one or both parties was new to the trade,
whether either or both had counsel, and the nature and length of their
relationship, as well as their age, experience, education, and
sophistication.” 11 Williston on Contracts § 32:7 (4th ed. 2016).
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conventional meaning in some language, in many cases a dictionary and
the rules of grammar are enough to identify literal meaning. Because use
meaning and the parties’ actual agreement can depart from literal meaning,
context evidence is more relevant to determining either. In short, thin
interpretive rules are likely to be more accurate when interpreting a speech
act’s literal meaning than when interpreting its use meaning or the parties’
actual agreement.
It does not follow that other interpretive inputs are never relevant to
determining a speech act’s literal meaning. I have already identified several
ways that context evidence can help determine literal meaning—when
there is an ambiguity, when a word’s conventional meaning turns on the
circumstances of its utterances, and when the parties are speaking a local
dialect. Contrariwise, as the discussion of plain meaning rules will illustrate,
it is possible to interpret the use meaning or the parties’ actual agreement
on a very thin interpretive base. In short, literal meaning formalism does not
preclude a thick interpretive base, and the interpretation of use meaning or
actual agreement is compatible with evidentiary formalism.
2.2.3

Plain meaning rules

Although a perspicacious theory of legal interpretation should,
following Wigmore, distinguish between the legally relevant meaning and
the permissible evidence of that meaning, in practice the two questions are
often answered together. Both are components of so-called plain meaning
rules. Just what courts mean by “plain meaning” is not always plain. This
section describes one variation, relying primarily on New York case law.
A plain meaning rule must answer two questions: When does the
rule apply? And: What does the rule require?
I address the first question in Part Four, which discusses the rules
governing integration. For now a summary answer suffices. Courts typically
apply plain meaning rules when any of three conditions are satisfied: the
parties have expressly agreed that their agreement shall be interpreted
according to its plain meaning; the parties have memorialized their
agreement in an integrated writing; or the parties have executed a sealed
instrument. Although in theory there are circumstances in which it would
be correct to apply a plain meaning rule to oral communications,98 in
practice plain meaning rules are applied only to writings.
More salient at this stage is the second question: What is a writing’s
plain meaning? Or what is the same, what sort of interpretation do plain
meaning rules require? The answer has several parts.

98

An example is the oft-mentioned theoretical possibility of an integrated
oral agreement. Similarly, parties might orally agree that their oral
agreement shall be interpreted according to its plain meaning.
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First, plain meaning rules are strongly associated with textualism, or
evidentiary formalism. Illustrative is the New York Court of Appeals’
statement in W.W.W. Associates, Inc. v. Giancontieri:
[W]hen parties set down their agreement in a clear, complete
document, their writing should as a rule be enforced according to
its terms. Evidence outside the four corners of the document as to
what was really intended but unstated or misstated is generally
inadmissible to add to or vary the writing.99
Extrinsic evidence may be introduced when the writing is unclear, that is,
ambiguous. But whether or not the writing is ambiguous is also to be
determined from the text itself. “[E]xtrinsic and parol evidence is not
admissible to create an ambiguity in a written agreement which is complete
and clear and unambiguous upon its face.”100
This very narrow interpretive base gives considerable weight to a
writing’s literal meaning. Without extensive extrinsic evidence, words’
conventional meaning is often all that remains. This raises the question of
which literal meaning should provide the starting point for interpretation:
local meaning, when evidence of a local dialect exists, or the common
meanings found in dictionaries. Although there is not a great deal of case
law on the question, New York courts appear to hold that when local
meaning departs from common meaning—when the parties are speaking in
dialect—local meaning controls. “Technical words in a contract must be
taken in a technical sense unless the context of the instrument or a usage
which is applicable clearly indicates a different meaning.”101 As noted

99

W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (1990). See
also R/S Assocs. v. N.Y. Job Dev. Auth., 98 N.Y.2d 29, 32 (2002).
100
Id. at 163 (quoting Intercontinental Planning v. Daystrom, Inc., 24
N.Y.2d 372, 379 (1969)).
101
Nau v. Vulcan Rail & Constr. Co., 286 N.Y. 188, 198 (1941) (construing
several terms used in patents and patent practice, and concluding that the
agreement “was plain and unambiguous on its face”). See also HNC Realty
Co. v. Bay View Towers Apartments, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 774, 780 (1978)
(“Parol evidence would have been admissible to introduce proof of usage
and custom and to define the meaning intended by the parties of the term
‘surety payment bond’ as used in the contract.”); Estate of Hatch by Ruzow
v. Nyco Minerals Inc., 666 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (1997) (“Moreover, technical
words are to be interpreted as usually understood by the persons in the
profession or business to which they relate, and must be taken in the
technical sense unless the context of the instrument or an applicable usage
or the surrounding circumstances clearly indicate a different meaning.”
(dicta, internal quotation marks omitteed)).
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above, Williston, in the first edition of his treatise is unequivocal on the
question. “That the local standard would be applied . . . seems to have
been early settled. Even though the local standard led to a construction
opposed to the literal meaning of the language this was true.”102 Under a
local meaning rule, the interpretive inputs must be expanded beyond the
text to include at least evidence of local dialects. “Neither, in the
construction of a contract among merchants, tradesmen, or others, will the
evidence [of local usage] be excluded because the words are in their
ordinary meaning unambiguous.”103 I assume going forward that plain
meaning rules are therefore not strictly textualist, but permit evidence of
local conventional meanings.
Although evidentiary formalism gives much more weight to literal
meanings, New York courts do not adhere to literal meaning formalism.
Giancontieri also states that the writing is to be “read as a whole to
determine its purpose and intent.”104 Or as the New York Court of Appeals
explained in an earlier case: “The meaning of a writing may be distorted
where undue force is given to single words or phrases. We read the writing
as a whole. We seek to give to each clause its intended purpose in the
promotion of the primary dominant purpose of the contract.”105 This
But see Mazzola v. Cty. of Suffolk, 533 N.Y.S.2d 297, 297 (1988)
(“The words and phrases used in an agreement must be given their plain
meaning so as to define the rights of the parties, and in this regard, it is
common practice for the courts of this State to refer to the dictionary to
determine the plain and ordinary meaning of words to a contract.” (internal
citation omitted)).
102
2 Williston (1st ed) § 608, 1172.
103
Id. at 1172 (quoting Brown v. Byrne, 3 E. & B. 703). In fact, Williston
suggests expanding it beyond even this. See, e.g., id. at § 618, 1198 (“The
circumstances under which a writing was made may always be shown. The
question the court is seeking to answer is the meaning of the writing at the
time and place when the contract was made; and all the surrounding
circumstances at that time necessarily throw light upon the meaning of the
contract.” (citation omitted)). Although there are strong formalist elements
in the first edition of his treatise, Williston focuses more on difference
between meaning and intent, and he does not espouse a plain meaning rule
in the contemporary sense.
104
Id. at 162.
105
Empire Properties Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 43 N.E. 2d 25 (N.Y.
1942). See also Fleischman v. Furgueson, 119 N.E. 400, 401 (N.Y. 1918)
(“In construing a contract the whole instrument must be considered and
from such consideration a conclusion reached as to what the parties
intended to do or sought to accomplish.”); Wolkind v. Berman, 232 A.D.
47, (N.Y. App. Div. 1931) (“The intent of the parties is determined by
considering the instrument which memorializes the agreement of the parties
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emphasis on interpreting document as a whole in light of its apparent
purpose takes interpretation beyond literal meaning to considerations of use
meaning and the parties’ apparent beliefs and intentions.
In Giancontieri the court found that the purpose of the clause at
issue corresponded to its literal meaning.106 But literal and use meaning can
come apart even in very thin forms of interpretation. In William C. Atwater
& Co. v. Panama R. Co., for example, the New York Court of Appeals
considered the meaning, in an installment contract for the sale of coal, of
the following provision: “Any portion of the tonnage remaining unshipped
at the date of expiration of this agreement shall be considered cancelled
without notice.”107 The sentence’s literal meaning would have released both
parties from liability for any coal unshipped by the end of the installment
period. The buyer therefore attempted to invoke it to avoid liability for coal
unshipped as a result of the buyer’s own unexcused refusal to accept earlier
shipments. Reading the agreement as a whole, however, and in light of the
seller’s option to reduce installments after a buyer breach, the court
concluded that the clause was intended to apply only to coal that remained
unshipped as a result of the seller’s exercise of that option. “Reason, equity,
fairness—all such lights on the probably intention of the parties—show
what the real agreement was.”108 In short, the writing’s use meaning
controlled, at the expense of its literal meaning.109
Williston, in the first edition of his treatise, explained the rule that
produces such outcomes:

as a whole.”). Even more radical are early statements by the Illinois
Supreme Court:
The rule is that the intention of the parties must govern, but that
intention is not to be sought merely in the apparent meaning of the
language used, but that the meaning of the language used may be
enlarged or limited according to the true intent of the parties, as
made manifest by the various provisions of the contract considered
as a whole.
Street v. Chicago Wharfing and Storage Co., 41 N.E. 1108, 1111 (Ill. 1895).
And: “Particular expressions will not control where the whole tenor or
purpose of the instrument forbids a literal interpretation of the specific
words.” McCoy v. Fahrney, 55 N.E. 61, 63 (Ill. 1899).
106
77. N.Y.2d at 163 (“[T]he face of the contract reveals a “logical reason”
for the explicit provision that the cancellation right contained in paragraph
31 should run to the seller as well as the purchaser.” (citation omitted)).
107
159 N.E. 418 (N.Y. 1927).
108
Id. at 419.
109
For other examples, see Washington Construction Co. v. Spinella, 84
A.2d 620 (N.J. 1951); Motorsports Racing Plus v. Arctic Cat Sales, 666
N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2003).
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[I]n giving effect to the general meaning of a writing particular
words are sometimes wholly disregarded, or supplied. Thus “or”
may be given the meaning of “and,” or vice versa, if the remainder
of the agreement shows that a reasonable person in the position of
the parties would so understand it.110
When the whole of a writing evinces a purpose contrary to the literal
meaning of one of its clauses, the clause’s use meaning and the parties’
apparent intentions control. Plain meaning should not be confused with
literal meaning.
In sum, New York’s plain meaning rule has three components: The
first is a high degree of evidentiary formalism. The interpretive inputs
should include only the text, a dictionary, any extrinsic evidence of local
conventional meanings, and the interpreter’s background understanding of
the English language and the world. Second, when interpreting the text’s
literal meaning, priority should be given to demonstrable local meanings
over common ones. That said, and third, the goal of interpretation is to
identify the text’s use meaning, to the extent it can be gleaned from the
agreement as a whole. Although a text’s plain meaning often is its literal
meaning, sometimes the document as a whole will indicate a purpose at
odds with that literal meaning, in which case the parties’ probable
intentions control. The output of this interpretive process is the text’s plain
meaning. Only when the plain meaning is ambiguous or otherwise fails
under the relevant altering rule to determine the legal state of affairs may
the interpreter look to other interpretive evidence of the words’ use
meaning or the parties’ actual beliefs and intentions.
There is more to say about plain meaning rules. I have not, for
example, discussed the respective roles of the judge and jury.111 Nor do
other states follow New York in all the details of the above rule, or are New
York courts completely consistent in the rule’s application or articulation.
But the above account provides a useful example for an assessment of
when and where lawmakers should adopt interpretive formalism, which is
the project of the next Part.
3

Design Considerations

Having identified two general forms of formalism in contract law, I
now consider how and when each might be deployed. How formalist
should the rules of contract interpretation and construction be? This is a
design question. It asks what sorts of altering rules best serve contract law’s
110

2 Williston (1st ed.) § 619, 1199.
See, e.g., Nucci v. Warshaw Const. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 16, 20 (1962)
(“The interpretation of written contracts ordinarily presents a question of
law for the court.”).

111
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purpose or purposes. In order to answer it, we therefore need to know
something about the goals of contract altering rules. What are such rules
meant to do? When do they succeed? When do they fail?
The analysis that follows adopts the following working hypothesis:
the primary goal of contract exposition, stated at a high level of generality,
is to accurately identify how the parties actually intended and understood
their words and actions.112 Or as courts regularly intone, “[t]he
fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is that agreements
are construed in accord with the parties’ intent.”113 This is not to say that the
parties’ intentions and understandings always control, or that contractual
obligations are designed to perfectly mirror them. Sometimes the parties do
not share an intent, in which case the law must look elsewhere—the
problem that animates the objective theory. Even when the parties are in
full agreement, contract law might not give full effect to their shared
intentions—for example, if their agreement is contrary to public policy. And
sometimes rules of construction are designed to favor one outcome or
another. But the parties’ intent, or some proxy for it, is generally the starting
point. Contract law is designed to condition parties’ legal obligations on
their actual intentions and understandings. The goal is to enforce, ceteris
paribus, the parties’ actual agreement.
It does not follow that the rules of contract law will always direct
courts to seek parties’ actual agreement, intentions, beliefs, etc. This is
obviously so when the parties have different intentions or understandings.
When there is no actual agreement or shared understanding, the legal state
of affairs must turn on other aspects of the parties’ transaction. Alternatively
or in addition, lawmakers might not trust legal decision makers to correctly
identify the parties’ actual agreement. Or the costs of accurately identifying
their actual agreement might be higher than lawmakers are willing to pay.
Finally, rules of construction are sometimes designed to promote social
interests that do not correspond to one or both parties’ actual intentions. For
these and other reasons, contract altering rules often employ proxies:
112

For defenses of this claim, see Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as
Agreement, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 353 (2007); E. Allen Farnsworth,
“Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L.J. 939 (1967).
113
Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 562, 569 (2002). A few
other examples: “The primary goal in interpreting contracts is to determine
and enforce the parties’ intent.” Old Kent Bank v. Sobczak, 243 Mich. App.
57, 63 (2000). “Under statutory rules of contract interpretation, the mutual
intention of the parties at the time the contract is formed governs
interpretation.” AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 821 (1990)
(citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1636). “The cardinal rule for interpretation of
contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that
intention, consistent with legal principles.” Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. v.
Regal Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tenn. 1975).
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formalities, literal meaning or use meaning, thin interpretation. All serve as
relatively cheap and, one hopes, generally accurate stand-ins for the
parties’ actual intent and understandings of their words and actions.
Another way of putting this is that although the principal goal of
contract altering rules is to identify parties’ actual agreements, intentions
and understandings, accuracy in that endeavor is not the only factor to
consider when designing such rules. The law does not and should not seek
accuracy at all costs. In the discussion that follows, I identify several
additional factors that should go into the choice of altering rules. A
perspicacious account of the design of contract altering rules, including
when to adopt formalist rules of one type or another, requires attention to
accuracy, transaction costs, predictability, responsiveness to the law, and
relational costs, as well as policy goals independent of the parties’ intent.114
These factors reappear in the analysis of each form of formalism that I have
identified, though they manifest themselves in different ways.
The first section of this Part examines formalistic altering rules. The
second discusses interpretive formalism and plain meaning rules.
3.1

Formalities

The early twentieth century saw a general move away from contract
formalistic altering rules, exemplified by the decline of the seal. But
formalities can be extremely useful legal tools. In order to understand just
when they are useful, we need a few concepts from legal theory: the ideas
of juristic acts and of power-conferring rules.
3.1.1

Juristic and nonjuristic altering rules

Formalistic altering rules condition legal change on the use of a
formality. The first thing to notice about formalities is that they are typically
designed for users who intend the legal outcomes that attach to them.115 As
I observed in section 2.1, a formality like the seal or “F.O.B.” is a tool that
parties can use to effect legal change when they wish. Formalities are
therefore designed primarily for what German legal theorists call
“Rechtsgeschäfte,” or juristic acts:
The juristic act . . . is a declaration of private will directed at the
realization of a legal effect, an effect that follows on the authority of
114

For other lists of relevant factors, see Katz, supra note 10 at 522-36; Eric
A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, The Plain Meaning Rule, and The
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 543-47
(1998).
115
“Typically” because social policies can also figure into the design of
formalities, as illustrated by the old legal reading of “children” in
testamentary documents described in section 2.1 above.
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the legal system because it is willed. The essence of the juristic act
is found in the fact that a will directed at the realization of the legal
effect is confirmed, and that the legal system issues a judgment, in
recognition of that will, that gives legal effect to the desired legal
arrangement.116
A juristic act is one that can be translated into a sentence that begins, “I/we
hereby determine that . . .,” where the ellipsis is replaced by a proposition
that describes a legal change, as in, “We the Congress of the United States
hereby enact . . .” or “I hereby determine that upon my death, my property
shall be distributed as follows . . .” Although Anglo-American legal theorists
have not paid much attention to the category of juristic acts,117 they are
ubiquitous in the law. Examples include legislative votes, executive orders,
judicial decrees, marriage licenses, formal wills, and transfer deeds. All are
expressions of the speaker’s intention to change the legal state of affairs by
the very expression of that intention.
A juristic act succeeds in effecting a legal change when the
intended “legal effect . . . follows on the authority of the legal system.” That
is, a juristic act succeeds when there is an authorizing law that says that the
speaker can effect the relevant legal change by expressing, in the right way,
her intention to do so. Such authorizing laws are what H.L.A. Hart calls
“power-conferring rules.” They “provide that human beings may by doing
or saying certain things introduce new [laws], extinguish or modify old
ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or control their
operations.”118 Power-conferring laws that identify acts sufficient to effect
the relevant legal change are juristic altering rules.
Formalities such as the seal and “F.O.B.” are tools for performing
juristic acts. But notice that not all juristic acts employ formalities. Recall
Williston’s Model Written Obligations Act: “A written release or promise,
hereafter made and signed by the person releasing or promising, shall not
be invalid or unenforceable for lack of consideration, if the writing also
contains an additional express statement, in any form of language, that the
signer intends to be legally bound.”119 The rule requires a juristic act: the
signer’s “express statement . . . that the signer intends to be legally bound.”
116

1 Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das
Deutsche Reich, 126 (Berlin & Leipzig, J. Guttentag 1888) (Ger.) (author’s
translation).
117
The great exception was John Henry Wigmore. See 5 John Henry
Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence in Trials at
Common Law, § 2401, 238 (2d ed. 1924) (describing the category of “jural
acts”). The idea of a juristic act is essential to Wigmore’s account of the
parol evidence rule.
118
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 81 (2d ed. 1994).
119
Model Written Obligations Act, supra note 82.
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And it includes a formal requirement: the expression must be in a signed
writing. But the rule expressly abjures a requisite formality. The statement
may be “in any form of language.” All that is necessary is that the statement
have the right literal meaning.
Nor are all contract altering acts—and this is absolutely crucial—
juristic ones. Contracts are distinguished from constitutions, statutes,
regulations, deeds, wills and oaths of office by this fact: in many instances
contract law does not require that parties express an intent to alter their
legal situation in order to do so. The most obvious example is the
conditions of contractual validity. The creation of an informal contract
requires only an agreement for consideration. Consider the following
Second Restatement example of an implied-in-fact contract:
A, on passing a market, where he has an account, sees a box of
apples marked “25 cts. each.” A picks up an apple, holds it up so
that a clerk of the establishment sees the act. The clerk nods, and A
passes on. A has promised to pay twenty-five cents for the apple.120
Here there is no “declaration of private will directed at the realization of a
legal effect.” In fact, there is not even an express nonlegal agreement. All
we have are two nonlinguistic but in context meaningful acts—holding the
apple up and a nod in response—that together establish that an agreement
has been reached. That is enough, according to the conditions of
contractual validity, to create a contract. As Section 21 of the Second
Restatement puts the point, “[n]either real nor apparent intention that a
promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract.”121
The same holds true of acts that determine the content of contractual
obligations. Thus UCC section 2-313 provides that any affirmation of fact,
description of goods, or sample or model made by the seller that is part of
the basis of the bargain is enough to create a warranty, explaining, “[i]t is
not necessary . . . that the seller use formal words such as ‘warrant’ or
‘guarantee’ or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty.”122
Other familiar examples include rules governing offers, modifications,
waivers, repudiations and releases. The altering acts that determine the
validity and content of contracts often need not express an intent to effect
legal change. They can but need not be juristic acts.
The altering acts that figure into contract law can therefore be
divided up as follows:

120

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4 cmt. a, ill. 2.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 21 (1981). For more on this and
related rules, see Klass, Intent to Contract, supra note 22, at 1443-60.
122
U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
121
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Figure 4
Contract Altering Acts

Juristic Acts

Formalities
(evincing a legal intent)

Nonjuristic Acts
(expressing a nonlegal intent)

Acts with a Juristic Meaning
(expressing a legal intent)

Successful juristic altering acts effect legal change by expressing or evincing
an intention to do so. Nonjuristic altering acts effect legal change without
necessarily expressing or evincing an intention to do so. Juristic acts can
then be further divided between those that employ formalities and those
that do not. Formalities are effective in virtue of their form alone. Other
juristic altering acts are effective in virtue of their meaning. Each of the
three types of acts effects a legal change due to an associated altering rule.
We can therefore also divide altering rules into juristic and nonjuristic,
depending on the type of altering act they require. Juristic altering rules are
what Hart calls power-conferring rules. We can further divide juristic
altering rules into formalistic and interpretive ones, depending on whether
they specify a formality or an act with the right meaning as sufficient to
effect the legal change.
This taxonomy entails something important about when lawmakers
should adopt formalistic altering rules like the seal or “F.O.B.” Such rules
make sense when the goal is to give persons the power to purposively
change the existing legal state of affairs. Just when this is so is a deeper
question than this article can answer.123 But the many contract rules that
give legal effect to nonjuristic acts suggest that contract law often seeks to
do more than give individuals the power to change their legal situation
when they wish. Many contract altering rules determine the legal situation
based on parties’ nonlegal words and acts. If, for example, an exchange
agreement creates a contract whether or not the parties were thinking about
legal liability, or if a seller’s bare representation about the quality goods is
enough to create an express warranty, a plausible explanation is that we
sometimes want to impose contractual obligations for reasons other than
the parties’ intent to undertake them. Where the reason for imposing
123

For more on the question, see Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract:
Duty, Power and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1726 (2008).
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liability does not turn on the speaker’s legal intent, a formalistic altering
rule will not serve.
3.1.2

When and how formalities work

Formalistic altering rules work when the goal is to give parties the
power to alter their legal situation when they wish. Here too there is a
choice: between adopting a formalistic altering rule, an interpretive one, or
some combination of the two. In making that choice, lawmakers should
consider five factors: accuracy, transaction costs, predictability, relational
costs and party responsiveness.
Two important advantages of formalities are low transaction costs
and high predictability. Formalities are typically cheap for knowledgeable
parties to produce. Parties need only use the magic words or symbols to
achieve the desired legal effect. And formalities are cheap for adjudicators
to construe. Correct use of the formality can obviate the need for additional
evidence or interpretation of the parties’ legal intent. Finally, formalistic
altering rules provide highly predictable outcomes. Contracts casebooks are
filled with cases in which the best interpretation of the parties’ words and
actions is uncertain. By avoiding interpretation altogether, formalities
achieve greater predictability. Parties who know the code will know the
legal effect of their words and actions. To the extent that lawmakers want to
make it easy for parties to achieve the legal effects they desire,124 formalities
appear to be the way to go.
If there is a worry about formalities, it lies in their accuracy with
respect to parties’ actual intentions. Because we are in the world of juristic
altering rules, “accuracy” here refers to the ability to correctly identify when
a legal actor intends to effect the legal change associated with the formality.
Joseph Raz describes the connection between power-conferring rules, legal
intent and formalities as follows:
[The choice-promoting function of legal powers] explains why they
are exercised either by special formal and ceremonial acts as in
making a deed or getting married, or by ordinary actions whose
legal consequences approximate to their non-legal and obvious
consequences, as in making a contract. It also explains why most
legal powers are exercised by acts with only negligible nonnormative consequences, like signing, so that there are few reasons
for or against doing them apart from their legal or other normative
consequences.125

124

See the discussion of the possible advantages of impeding altering rules
later in this section.
125
Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers (pt. 2), in 46
Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y 79, 81 (Supp. 1972).
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A formality misfires when a legal actor’s intent does not correspond to the
legal effect of the words she uses. As Ian Ayres observes in his account of
altering rules, lawmakers should worry about both Type I and Type II errors
of this sort, false positives and false negatives.126
A Type I error is the use of a formality absent an intent to effect the
associated legal change. The risk of such errors was among the arguments
in the early twentieth century for abolishing the seal. In 1915 Judge Fredrick
Crane lamented the degradation of the seal from impressed wax to the
“scrawl of a pen,” without attaching any “ceremony and solemnity to the
execution of important instruments, by means of which the attention of the
parties is more certainly and effectually fixed.”127 The result, Crane argued,
was what we would today call Type I errors. “While the necessity for the
private seal has virtually gone, its use still remains, with many serious and
ensnaring effects. A study of the cases will convince one that people make
use of the printed or written ‘L.S.’ without fully appreciating its effect.”128
Formalistic boilerplate can be another trap for the unwary. Recall
Boardman’s observation that standard clauses in contemporary insurance
contracts are often best understood as “a private conversation between
drafters and the courts.”129 The consumer who relies on the literal meaning
of the words in her policy might not understand their legal effect. The old
rule for construing “children” in a testamentary document probably also
resulted in Type I errors. A testator who did not know the legal meaning of
the word might use it expecting that property would go to all of his or her
children, though its legal operation would disinherit children born out of
marriage.
The accuracy of formalities therefore depends in large part on
parties’ sensitivity to legal rules. I will say that parties are responsive when
they are aware of a law and craft their words and actions in light of it.
Responsive parties are sometimes described as “sophisticated.” But
responsiveness is not a personality trait. A party might, for example, be
more responsive to the legal regime during some stages of a transaction and
less responsive at others. And as every corporate counsel knows, even
experienced businesspeople—whom we might naturally think of as
sophisticated—sometimes do not take the legal effects of their words and
actions into account.130
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Ayres, supra note 22, at 2066.
Frederick E. Crane, The Magic of the Private Seal, 15 Colum. L. Rev. 24,
24 (1915) (quoting Chancellor Kent in Warren v. Lynch, (N.Y. 1810) 5
Johns. 238).
128
Id. at 25.
129
Boardman, supra note 93.
130
The story of pari passu clauses in sovereign debt contracts provides a
nice example of unresponsive sophisticated parties. See supra note 51.
127
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Responsive parties are able to use legal formalities to their benefit.
Unresponsive parties, on the contrary, are less likely to know or understand
a formality’s legal effect. Type I errors are especially likely when
unresponsive parties sign agreements drafted by responsive parties—when
only one side knows the code.
A potential solution is education. The formality might be designed,
for example, to convey information to its users, turning unresponsive parties
into responsive ones.131 As Crane argued, ceremonial formalities can
impress on users that the act has serious consequences. Or the formality
might be designed to tell users about its legal effects. If contract boilerplate
is problematic because the ordinary meaning of a its words do not
correspond to their legal effect, the solution would seem to be to require
words that say, in ordinary language, just what those legal effects are.
Although not a formality in the technical sense used here, the Consumer
Finance Protection Bureau’s model mortgage disclosure form provide an
example. Through empirical study, regulators identified a form of
expression that is more likely to inform consumers of the terms of the
transaction.132 In short, formalities might be designed to provide not only a
clear path to certain legal results, but also to clarify to their users what those
results are.
That said, the more information lawmakers attempt to pack into a
formality, the more expensive it is to use. This is an example of a common
dynamic Ayres identifies in the design of altering rules: a tradeoff between
transaction costs and error reduction.133 Even more concerning is empirical
evidence that such education does not work. If consumers or other
unresponsive parties do not read the agreements they sign, it does not
matter what words the law requires for their effectiveness.134 Whether,
131

For more on the design error-reducing altering rules generally, see Ayres,
supra note 22, at 2068-84.
132
Available at: http://www.consumerfinance.gov/owning-a-home/closingdisclosure/. For background on the form’s design, see Federal Trade
Commission, Report: Improving Consumer Mortgage Disclosures: An
Empirical Assessment of Current and Prototype Disclosure Forms: A Bureau
of Economics Staff Report (June 13, 2007), available at:
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/improving-consumer-mortgage-disclosuresempirical-assessment-current-prototype-disclosure.
The mortgage form is not a formality in my sense of the term
because failure to use it does not render the loan invalid, but merely
subjects the lender to potential legal liability. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(f) & 2615.
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Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form
Contracts, 43 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2014) (finding that virtually no consumers
read online end user license agreements); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E.
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when and how formalities might be designed to avoid Type I errors is an
empirical question that is likely to receive different answers in different
contexts, depending on factors such as the identity of the parties and the
nature of the transaction between them.
An alternative solution is to make the effects of the formality
defeasible—to permit interpretive evidence that a user or users did not in
fact intend the associated legal result. And in fact, many formalistic altering
rules have this feature. Thus the section 2-319 payment rules for “F.O.B.”
apply only “unless otherwise agreed.”135 Where the parties have agreed, for
example, that payment is to be made by a letter of credit, the buyer is not
required to make tender of payment against the required documents, as the
rule otherwise prescribes.136 And as noted above, many states now treat the
seal as creating only a rebuttable presumption of consideration. The costs in
predictability and judicial economy are obvious. When a formality is
nondefeasible, its use ends the inquiry. Some, though not all, of that
advantages is lost if parties are permitted to introduce interpretive evidence
to defeat the formality.
Sometimes, however, lawmakers might consider Type I errors
desirable. Recall the early, nondefeasible rule for testamentary uses of
“children,” which read the word to refer only to children by marriage. One
might guess that the purpose of this rule was not, or not only, to effect
testators’ intentions, but to favor some offspring over others. Here the
formality is used not, or not only, as evidence of the party’s intent, but to
promote other social goals. Attaching an automatic legal effect, defeasible
or nondefeasible, to an everyday word can also be a tool for guiding
parties’ to legal results that they might not intend.
Type II errors are false negatives and occur when parties wish to
achieve a certain legal result but fail to satisfy an altering rule that would
secure it. With respect to formalistic altering rules, a Type II error happens
when parties who want to achieve a legal effect do not use the magic
words, whether because they do not know them or because they make a
mistake in expression. The solution here is rules that say that correct use of
the formality is sufficient but not necessary to effect a legal change. By also
allowing parties to achieve the desired legal effect without using the
formality—by stipulating that it is also enough to say words with the right
meaning—lawmakers can make it easier for unresponsive parties to achieve

Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure (2014) (discussing the limited effectiveness of disclosure rules).
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U.C.C. § 2-319(4).
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Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. v. Seiko Sporting Goods, U.S.A. Co., 184 Ill.
App. 3d 783, 791-92 (1989).
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the legal effects they want. In order to avoid Type II errors, formalistic
altering rules should be supplemented with interpretive ones.137
Again there are tradeoffs. Like nondefeasible legal effects, a requisite
formality—one that is the only path to a legal outcome—can mean greater
predictability and lower costs of adjudication. If the parties have not said
the magic words, they have not effected the legal change. That is no longer
the case if using the formality is not the only way to reach the desired legal
state of affairs.
Requisite formalities can have other advantages as well. If it is
possible to design a formality to educate unresponsive parties about legal
consequences, that is a reason to require its use. In such a case, the
advantage from reducing Type I errors—misunderstanding of the legal
effects—might outweigh the costs of any resulting Type II errors—failing to
use the right words to achieve those legal effects.
Alternatively, as Ayres points out, requiring a formality might
sometimes serve a desirable sorting function. “An altering rule with
arbitrary language operates as a password that allows knowledgeable
parties to achieve a desired result without running the risk that
unknowledgeable parties will mistakenly invoke the sufficient condition.”138
In other words, lawmakers might sometimes consider Type II errors among
unresponsive parties to be a good thing. More generally, when there is a
social interest in having parties stick with a default, it can make sense to
design the altering rule to impede departures from it.139 Requisite costly
formalities like recitations, waiting periods, recording taxes and the like can
ensure that only those who attach a high value to the resulting legal change
will take the trouble. Again, such mechanisms work only if using the
formality is the only way to achieve the desired legal change.140

137

Ayres provides a similar explanation of why altering rules commonly
identify acts that are sufficient but not necessary to achieve legal change.
Giving effect to a multiplicity of methods [to avoid the default]
reduces the costs of learning the law—especially the necessity to
learn the altering rules themselves. A contract law that includes
necessary elements for displacement will tend to increase the cost of
becoming (and remaining) informed of the requisite procedures for
displacement.
Ayres, supra note 22, at 2055 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 2081-82
(arguing that the best “password altering rules . . . are nonexclusive
means—and are merely sufficient safe harbors—for achieving particular
contractual concerns”).
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Id. at 2081.
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Id. at 2084-96.
140
Similar advantages can be secured by adding formal requirements to
interpretive altering rules.
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So far I have been treating party transaction costs as if they involved
only the cost of understanding and producing the formality. But formalities
sometimes come with another type cost. Exchange transactions often
depend on a mix of legal and nonlegal forms of trust. A party who expects
to engage in multiple transactions with her counterpart might choose to
perform because breach would jeopardize that future income stream. A
party who engages in similar transactions with others might worry about the
reputational effects of breach. Parties in close-knit communities or in
longstanding relationships might trust in one another’s honor, good will or
moral sensitivity. These extralegal incentives can be as strong or stronger
than legal ones, often add considerable value to exchange transactions, and
in some cases have an intrinsic value of their own.
I have argued elsewhere that juristic formation rules that require
parties to say that they want legal enforcement can in some circumstances
interfere with and erode extralegal forms of trust.
Particularly at the early stages of relational contracts, where both
parties understand that the transaction’s value depends on their
ability to work together to resolve disputes, one party’s expressed
attitude towards the availability of legal liability . . . might be a deal
breaker. And even if the deal still happens, forcing the parties to
express [such] preferences at the beginning of their relationship can
erode relationship-preserving norms that would otherwise add value
to the transaction. Even where expectations or preferences regarding
legal liability are mutually understood, those attitudes are often
better left unspoken.141
One can easily imagine situations in which forcing parties to express their
legal intent with a formality might further increase those costs. As Stuart
McCauley observed, “[b]usinessmen often prefer to rely on ‘a man’s word’
in a brief letter, a handshake, or ‘common honesty and decency’—even
when the transaction involves exposure to serious risks.”142 Here theory
again hits empirics. The existence and size of such relational costs are likely
to differ between different types of contractual transactions. A merger
agreement between two multi-national corporations is not the same as a
long-term supply contract between two local businesses, which in turn
differs from a promissory exchange between friends or family members.
When formalities will impose relational costs, and how large those costs
will be, is an empirical question that theory can identify but not answer.
Where such relational costs exist we can expect them to be another
cause of Type II errors. Parties who prefer legal liability might choose not to
141
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employ a requisite formality because each worries about the signal it will
send the other. The design solution here is the same as above:
supplementing the formality with an interpretive altering rule that provides
an alternative path to the desired legal change. That rule might be a juristic
one, permitting the parties to use less formal words to express or indicate
their legal intent. Or it might be a nonjuristic one, identifying certain acts
that make legal liability appropriate even though the parties have not
expressly asked for it.143
The above analysis of when and how to employ formalistic altering
rules can be summarized as follows. Formalities are primarily of use when
the goal is to give parties the power to intentionally alter their legal
situation. That is, formalities are primarily useful in the design of juristic
altering rules. When lawmakers seek to condition the legal state of affairs
on parties’ nonlegal acts and expressions, formalities do not serve. And
even when lawmakers want to give parties the power to change their legal
obligations, formalities are not the only option. Interpretive juristic altering
rules can supplement or provide alternatives to formalistic ones. When a
rule applies to transactions between responsive parties—parties who know
and respond to legal rules—a formality provides a cheap and predictable
legal tool. But when unresponsive parties are involved, lawmakers might
worry about accuracy. Type II errors can be solved pairing formalistic
altering rules with interpretive ones, thereby giving parties who do not
know the rule alternative and more accessible paths to effect legal change
when they wish. Alternative paths can also address Type II errors among
responsive parties who might wish to avoid formalities because of their
relational costs. There are two possible ways to reduce Type I errors. One is
education, which can be expensive and does not always work. The other is
making the formality defeasible. Both alternative paths and defeasible
effects, however, rob formalities of some of their advantages.
3.2

Interpretive formalism

Part Two analyzed plain meaning rules as employing a mix of
evidentiary and literal meaning formalism. By sharply limiting the
interpretive inputs, plain meaning rules give priority to literal meaning. But
a plain meaning rule can also direct interpreters to consider evidence of
local conventional meanings, which expands the evidentiary base. And
plain meaning rules typically instruct them to evaluate individual words in
light of the parties’ purposes as evidenced in the document as a whole. The
latter rule means that the literal meaning of the parties’ words sometimes
gives way to their use meaning—though less often than it would with a
thicker interpretive base.
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For examples of the latter, see the analysis of spousal agreements in
Klass, Intent to Contract, supra note 22, at 1488-97.
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This section considers some design considerations relevant to
interpretive formalism generally, and especially plain meaning formalism.
Before getting there, however, I consider a relatively common antiformalist
claim: that there is no such thing as plain meaning.
3.2.1

Plain meaning and the theory of language

Corbin, in the first edition of his treatise, formulates the claim as
follows:
[I]t can hardly be insisted on too often or too vigorously that
language at its best is always a defective and uncertain instrument,
that words do not define themselves, that terms and sentences in a
contract, a deed, or a will do not apply themselves to external
objects and performances, that the meaning of such terms and
sentences consists of the ideas that they induce in the mind of some
individual person who uses or hears or reads them, and that seldom
in a litigated case do the words of a contract convey one identical
meaning to two contracting parties or to third persons. Therefore, it
is invariably necessary, before a court can give any meaning to the
words of a contract and can select one meaning rather than other
possible ones as the basis for the determination of rights and other
legal effects, that extrinsic evidence shall be heard to make the court
aware of the “surrounding circumstances,” including the persons,
objects, and events to which the words can be applied and which
caused the words to be used.144
Corbin is arguing in effect that there is no such thing as plain meaning.145
“’[M]eaning’ cannot exist without a speaker or hearer,” and “no word or
phrase has one true and unalterable meaning.”146 Meaning only happens
when words are used in a particular setting for a specific purpose. The idea
that words could have a meaning apart form their contextually determined
use is an outdated form of magical thinking. Considered in isolation, words
on the page are dead letters.
This line of thought is relatively common among antiformalists.
Justice Traynor in Pacific Gas writes:

144

3 Corbin (1st ed.) § 537 at ___.
Corbin was no philosopher of language, and the paragraph is not a
model of clarity. There is also a suggestion that plain meaning is unlikely to
capture the parties’ actual agreement. I address this worry in the next
section, in the discussion of plain meaning rules and correspondence
errors.
146
Id. at § 535, ___ n. 15 & ____.
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Words, however, do not have absolute and constant referents. . . .
The meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with the
“verbal context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in
view of the linguistic education and experience of their users and
their hearers or readers (not excluding judges). . . . A word has no
meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an
objective meaning, one true meaning.”147
Melvin Eisenberg argues, “The proper interpretation of all purposive
expressions, including contractual expressions, is necessarily dynamic,
because the meaning of a purposive expression is always determined in
part by its context, and the context is prior to the expression.”148 Farnsworth
maintains, “The very concept of plain meaning finds scant support in
semantics, where one of the cardinal teachings is the fallibility of language
as a means of communication.”149 The comments to section 212 of the
Second Restatement, which concerns the interpretation of integrated
agreements, assert that “meaning can almost never be plain except in a
context.”150 And one finds a similar claim in the comments to section 2-202
of the UCC: “This section definitively rejects . . . [t]he premise that the
language used has the meaning attributable to such language by rules of
construction existing in the law rather than the meaning which arises out of
the commercial context in which it was used.”151
These arguments against the very possibility of plain meaning rest
on a non sequitur. I take them to begin from two correct premises. First, use
meaning is highly context dependent. Use meaning turns on the speaker’s
147

442 P.2d at 644-45 (quoting Arthur Linton Corbin, The Interpretation of
Words and the Parol Evidence Rule 50 Cornell L.Q. 161, 187 (1965)).
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Eisenberg, supra note 8 at 27.
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Farnsworth, supra note 112 at 952. See also E. Allan Farnsworth,
Contracts § 7.10, ___ (4th ed. 2004) (“Indeed, it is questionable whether a
word has meaning at all when divorced from the circumstances in which it
is used.”).
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. b. Cf. 3 Corbin (1st ed.)
§ 542, ___ (“[S]ome of the surrounding circumstances always must be
known before the meaning of the words can be plain and clear.”). A similar
claim can be found in the comments to section 214 of the Second
Restatement:
Words, written or oral, cannot apply themselves to the subject
matter. . . . Even though words seem on their face to have only a
single possible meaning, other meanings often appear when the
circumstances are disclosed.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214, cmt. b. Farnsworth was of course
the final Reporter on the Second Restatement.
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U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1.
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communicative intentions, and often we can correctly identify those
intentions only by considering the context in which the speaker acts.
Second, because words first acquire meaning through their use, there is a
sense in which use meaning is fundamental. Conventional meanings are
not merely correlations between words and objects, or sentences and
events. They are regular patterns of usage, of intended meanings.152 Words
do not have literal meanings absent their purposive use.
We can grant Corbin both these premises and still not follow him to
the conclusion that words do not have plain or literal meanings tout court.
Conventional meaning is like the desire lines in a city park—the paths of
wear that come from many individual trips across a grassy area. There are
no desire lines absent individual choices to walk to one place or another.
Nor do the worn paths constrain where people can walk. But a park’s
desire lines reflect patterns of choice. And a person might even use them
when deciding where to walk. The analogy is not perfect. Linguistic
conventions enable communication in ways that desire lines typically do
not enable crossing a park. (But consider a parent pushing a stroller when
the grass is long.) That said, there is this similarity: The fact that meaning is
in the first instance the product of use does not entail that there are no
patterns, conventions or defeasible rules of usage. And there can be such
patterns, conventions and defeasible rules even if they do not fully
determine the use to which words are put in a given instance, whether
because literal meaning is sometimes ambiguous or because speakers
sometimes make their point by flouting or otherwise departing from
linguistic conventions.
This is not yet to say whether parties’ contractual obligations should
turn on the literal meaning, plain meaning or the fully contextually
determined use meaning of what they say and do. The point is simply that
the ideas of literal and plain meaning are not incoherent. When Corbin
writes that “[b]y ‘interpretation of language’ we determine what ideas that
language induces in other persons,”153 he employs an unduly narrow
conception both of meaning and of legal interpretation.
3.2.2

Two differences between interpretive formalism and formalities

Before jumping into the analysis of interpretive formalism, it is
worth noting two broad differences between formalistic altering rules and
interpretive formalism.
The first turns on the distinction between juristic and nonjuristic
altering rules. My discussion of formalities in section 3.1.2 drew from Ian
Ayres’s original and important analysis of altering rules. But there is a
crucial difference between Ayres’s approach and mine. Ayres treats
152
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contract altering rules as instructions to the parties. “An altering rule in
essence says that if contractors say or do this, they will achieve a particular
contractual result.”154 Ayres therefore analogizes the design of altering rules
to the design of software interfaces.155 Just as a legal default is like the
default margins in a word processing program, so the associated altering
rule is like the commands one must execute to change those margins. Each
gives users a tool to effect a change in the relevant environment. Ayres
therefore suggests that altering rules that do not “give guidance about either
the non-default options or the mechanisms for achieving them” are
characteristic of “’immature’ regimes where the accretion of precedent has
not provided judicial disclosure guidance about particular mechanisms that
are sufficient to achieve particular alternatives.”156
Ayres’s conception of altering rules as instructions is of a piece with
his economic approach to contract law. Economic analysis focuses on how
legal rules influence decision-making. In the case of contract law, the
influence can reach not only parties’ perform-or-breach decision, but also
decisions they make at and around the time of formation. Economic
analysis’s sustained attention to those influences has provided important
contributions to our understanding of contract law generally.157 Ayres’s
theory of altering rules, like his earlier theory of defaults,158 explores the
incentives that the rules of contract construction create at the time of
formation, and suggests how lawmakers can design those rules to take
advantage of them. Add to this picture a recognition that our contract law is
designed at least in part to empower parties to get the legal obligations they
want, and it is a short step to imagining contract law as a set of instructions
telling legal subjects how to achieve their legal goals.
But this captures only part of the altering rules story—the left
branches in Figure 4 above. Ayres provides a theory of juristic altering rules
154
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only. It is true that, because juristic altering rules are designed to give
persons the power to effect legal change when they wish, they should give
guidance as to how to achieve those changes. Juristic altering rules are like
instructions. But nonjuristic altering rules are different. When the goal is to
condition legal outcomes on the nonlegal meaning of what the parties said
and did—whether they entered into an agreement, whether a seller made a
representation about the quality of the goods, whether a party expressed an
intention to perform despite the nonoccurrence of a condition—it is a
mistake to think of the altering rule as a set of instructions. This is not to say
that responsive parties won’t treat the rule that way, crafting their words
and actions in light of it. But a nonjuristic altering rule’s purpose or function
is not to give them such guidance. It is designed to attach legal effects to the
nonlegal meaning of what parties say and do. As such, it is not designed to
operate as instructions to them.
Another way of putting the point is this. One reason we have
interpretive in addition to formalistic altering rules, which Ayres’s account
makes room for, is to prevent Type II errors by parties who want the legal
effect but who do not know or who misuse the magic words. A separate
reason, which Ayres does not consider, is that sometimes we want legal
liability to turn on the nonlegal meaning of the parties’ words and actions,
whether they intended that effect or not. When that is the case, only
interpretive rules will do.
All this is important because an interpretive altering rule, unlike a
formalistic one, might identify either juristic or nonjuristic acts as sufficient
to effect legal change. The Model Written Obligations Act, for example, is a
juristic interpretive rule. To apply the rule, a legal decisionmaker must
interpret a party’s words to see whether they contain an “express statement
. . . that the signer intends to be legally bound.”159 The basic rule of contract
formation, in distinction, is a nonjuristic interpretive rule. To apply the rule,
a legal decisionmaker must interpret the parties’ words and actions to
determine whether “there is a manifestation of mutual assent to [an]
exchange.”160 The question is not whether the parties have expressed an
intent to alter the legal situation, but whether their words and actions
express their agreement to an exchange transaction. Whereas the goal of a
formality is always to correctly identify the parties’ legal intent, the goal of
an interpretive altering rule might be to identify the parties’ legal intent, or it
might be to identify their nonlegal intent or understanding.
This difference is crucial to the design of interpretive altering rules.
A formality typically works when its users know and intend to satisfy the
associated altering rule. A nonjuristic interpretive altering rule, in
distinction, can succeed even if the speaker is ignorant of that rule. Corbin
suggests the following example:
159
160
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There seems to be no serious doubt that a mutual agreement to
trade a horse for a cow would be an enforceable contract, even
though it is made by two ignorant persons who never heard of a
legal relation and who do not know that society offers any kind of a
remedy for the enforcement of such an agreement.161
Or more familiarly, recall the Article Two rule for express warranties. All a
seller needs to do to create a warranty is say something about the goods.
She need not express her intent to create a warranty.162 In the case of
altering rules like these, which look for nonjuristic acts, the rule can work
even if the speaker is unaware of it. Whereas the design of formalistic
altering rules always presupposes a minimum degree of party
responsiveness—knowledge of the formality and its legal effects—the
design of interpretive rules need not.
This is not to say that interpretive altering rules cannot be designed
with responsive parties in mind. Many parties know the interpretive altering
rules that will apply to their agreement and choose their words and actions
accordingly. And, I will argue, the strength of that feedback effect affects
the accuracy of formalist interpretive altering rules. When parties know that
their words will be interpreted with a limited evidentiary base or according
to their literal meaning, they will invest extra effort to express themselves in
terms amenable to such interpretation. The more parties are likely to
choose their words in light of the altering rule, the more accurate formalist
approaches will be. Unlike formalistic altering rules, however, an
interpretive altering rule can also function properly when the parties do not
know the rule. In fact, interpretive rules can be designed for parties who are
not thinking about the legal effects of their words and actions.
A second important difference between formalistic and interpretive
altering rules is in the ways each can lead to erroneous outcomes. A
formalistic altering rule goes awry when the formality’s legal effect does not
correspond to the legal actors intentions. A party might sign an agreement
with the letters “L.S.” printed at the bottom, for example, without
understanding their legal effect, or even realizing that they have one. The
same type of error can occur in interpretive altering rules. A plain meaning
altering rule, for example, misfires when the plain meaning of the parties’
words differs from their actual agreement, intentions or understandings. I
will call such errors correspondence errors. A correspondence error occurs
when a formality or legally relevant meaning does not correspond to the
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parties’ actual intentions or understandings.163 Both formalistic and
interpretive altering rules can generate correspondence errors.
The application of interpretive rules can result a second type of
error, one that is not much of a worry in the case of formalistic rules.
Adjudicators can also make errors of interpretation. If the parties are
speaking in a local dialect, for example, an adjudicator without reliable
evidence might mistake the literal meaning of their words in that language.
Or in the application of a use meaning rule, an adjudicator might
misinterpret the contextually determined objective meaning of what a
speaker said. I will call errors of this type interpretive errors. The analogy in
the application of a formalistic altering rule would be adjudicator error as to
whether the parties employed the formality. But because formalities are
designed to be easily identifiable, we such errors should be rare.
3.2.3

When and how interpretive formalism works

With these basic observations in hand, I now turn to the design of
interpretive altering rules, with particular attention to when plain meaning
rules are likely to work well.
We can begin with the question of evidence, or what Wigmore calls
the “sources” of interpretation. As with other questions of evidence, the
design problem can be stated in cost-benefit terms.164 The most salient
benefit of permitting additional relevant interpretive evidence is, one hopes,
greater interpretive accuracy. The more relevant evidence a competent
interpreter has about the transaction and the surrounding circumstances,
the better able she should be to correctly identify the meaning of the
parties’ words and actions. In short, more relevant evidence should mean
fewer interpretive errors. As I’ve emphasized, the magnitude of that benefit
depends both on the type of meaning in question and on the type of
evidence at issue. If the desired interpretive output is the common literal
meaning of a written agreement, evidence of trade usages and of the
circumstances surrounding the transaction is often of limited value. A
dictionary and the interpreter’s background understanding of the language
are often enough. If the desired interpretive output is a writing’s local literal
meaning, evidence of trade usage might bring more significant gains in
163
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accuracy, whereas evidence of the circumstances surrounding the
transaction remains of lesser relevance. If the desired interpretive output is a
writing’s use meaning, facts such as the parties’ relationship, the course of
negotiations, and any performance under the agreement are likely to bring
more significant gains in accuracy.
Although one can make broad generalizations about which sorts of
interpretive evidence are likely to be most useful in seeking out which
meanings, the accuracy gains from any given type of evidence depend on
empirical facts not amenable to armchair analysis. Lisa Bernstein has
argued, for example, that, “‘usages of trade’ and ‘commercial standards,’ as
those terms are used by the [UCC], may not consistently exist, even in
relatively close-knit merchant communities.”165 If Bernstein is correct,
permitting parties in the industries she studies to introduce usage of trade
evidence might produce more smoke than light. In industries in which
usages of trade and commercial standards do exist and are verifiable,
appeal to such evidence will bring greater interpretive accuracy. Which if
any industries satisfy that description is an empirical question. An
additional and critical empirical question concerns the ability of judges or
juries to correctly evaluate different types of evidence. More recently
Bernstein has argued that “court determinations relating to the existence,
content, and scope of usages are likely to be both inaccurate and highly
unpredictable, as they are typically made on the basis of very limited
information.”166 If courts are unable to correctly evaluate one or another
form of interpretive evidence, permitting that evidence might result in more
interpretive errors. If evidence that would be probative in an ideal world is
likely to mislead actual decision-makers, we might want to categorically
exclude it. As a corollary, if adjudicators are unable to locate or correctly
evaluate the interpretive evidence necessary to accurately interpret one or
another type of meaning, that is a reason not to condition legal outcomes
on meanings of that type.
Like formalities, evidentiary formalism should produce both
cheaper, faster adjudication and more predictable outcomes. Consider the
potential costs of the ruling in Pacific Gas & Electric v. G.W. Thomas
Drayage & Rigging,167 the most famous antiformalist opinion in US law. At
issue was the meaning of the words “Contractor shall indemnify Company .
. . against all loss, damage, expense and liability resulting from . . . injury to
property.”168 The trial court was able to identify the sentence’s literal
165
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meaning based only on its knowledge of the English language and perhaps
a dictionary: the clause covered all property damage, and therefore covered
damage to the property of the owner-party.169 This permitted the court to
rule on the clause’s legal effect at the beginning of the trial, narrowing the
issues going forward. The California Supreme Court held that the trial court
was wrong to exclude that extrinsic evidence that the parties actually
understood the indemnification clause to cover only third-party property
damage.
The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the
meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the
court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the
offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the
language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.170
This is a thick use meaning rule. Its predictable effect: a protracted battle
over how the parties, in the circumstances, understood the indemnification
clause, with both sides introducing party witnesses, expert testimony, facts
from the course of negotiations, and other extrinsic evidence, all of which
would be expensive and time consuming.171 Thinner interpretive rules are
relatively cheap to apply, thicker ones relatively expensive.
169

In fact, the literal meaning of the clause was not quite so obvious as
Traynor’s opinion suggests. The opinion does not mention that the Court of
Appeals looked to the meaning of “indemnifies” and the California Civil
Code’s definition of “indemnity” as a “contract by which one engages to
save another from a legal consequence of the conduct of one of the parties,
or of some other person.” Cal. Civ. Code § 2772 (emphasis added).
Reasoning that the owner of the steam turbine “did not incur any legal
liability for the damage done to its own property,” the intermediate court
concluded that the clause’s literal meaning did not cover the damage at
issue. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 62
Cal. Rptr. 203, 204 (Ct. App. 1967), vacated sub nom. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.
v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33 (1968). The court
went on to suggest that insofar as the clause was ambiguous, it should be
construed against the owner-drafter to reach the same result. Id. at 204-05.
In its brief to the California Supreme Court, the plaintiff pointed to other
definitions of “indemnify” that encompassed non-legal losses. Resp. Pet. for
Hearing By the Supreme Court, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas
Drayage & Rigging Co., ___-___, 1 Civil No. 23738 (filed Oct. 30, 1967).
There was therefore a good argument, unmentioned by Traynor, that the
plain meaning of indemnification clause was at least ambiguous.
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Evidentiary formalism also renders interpretive outcomes more
predictable. By permitting testimony that the clause was in fact meant to
cover only injuries to third parties, the California Supreme Court arguably
created doubt where it did not exist before. Resolution of the case now
required a judgment as to the weight of that extrinsic evidence as against
the words’ plain meaning. Thus Judge Kozinsky complained:
Pacific Gas casts a long shadow of uncertainty over all transactions
negotiated and executed under the law of California. . . . [E]ven
when the transaction is very sizeable, even if it involves only
sophisticated parties, even if it was negotiated with the aid of
counsel, even if it results in contract language that is devoid of
ambiguity, costly and protracted litigation cannot be avoided if one
party has a strong enough motive for challenging the contract.172
The more evidence one allows into interpretation, the less certain the
outcome. The costs of such uncertainty in the contractual setting can be
especially high. A party that wants to organize its behavior in light of the
legal effects of a contractual agreement needs to be able to predict how an
adjudicator will later interpret that agreement. To the extent thicker
interpretive rules reduce predictability, they impose an additional cost on
the parties.
In short, plain and literal meaning rules, by relying on a thin
interpretive base, reduce the costs of adjudication and make outcomes
more predictable, while achieving interpretive accuracy with respect to
literal meaning.
So why not always adopt a plain or literal meaning rule? The
problem is that the plain and literal meanings of the parties’ words might
differ significantly from the parties’ actual agreement. Kozinski’s polemic
ignores the risk of correspondence errors. In his Pacific Gas opinion,
Traynor quotes section 1636 of the California Civil Code: “A contract must
be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it
existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and
lawful.”173 The plain meaning of that statute seems to require California
courts to look beyond the plain meaning of the parties’ words and actions
when evidence indicates that that it does not capture their actual
party losses. 442 P.2d at 643. The plaintiff was also prepared to introduce
extensive evidence that the clause was meant to cover owner losses. See
Resp. Pet. for Hearing By the Supreme Court, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., ___-___, 1 Civil No. 23738 (filed Oct. 30,
1967).
172
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agreement. Thus Traynor expressly rejects plain meaning as the source of
contractual obligations.
Some courts have expressed the opinion that contractual obligations
are created by the mere use of certain words, whether or not there
was any intention to incur such obligations. Under this view,
contractual obligations flow not from the intention of the parties but
from the fact that they used certain magic words. Evidence of the
parties’ intention therefore becomes irrelevant.
In this state, however, the intention of the parties as
expressed in the contract is the source of contractual rights and
duties. A court must ascertain and give effect to this intention by
determining what the parties meant by the words they used.174
That is exactly what the defendant wanted a chance to prove in Pacific Gas:
what the parties meant by the words they used. If the parties truly
understood the indemnification clause to cover only third-party property
damage—and there were good arguments that they did—the trial court’s
application of a thin or literal meaning rule resulted in an inaccurate
interpretation. The plain meaning of their words did not correspond to their
actual agreement.
Although plain meaning rules reduce the costs of adjudication,
increase predictability and can provide interpretive accuracy with respect
to literal meaning, they create a higher risk of correspondence errors. Plain
meaning rules often produce literalist interpretations, and literal meaning is
sometimes a poor proxy for the parties’ actual agreement, and identification
of the parties’ actual intentions and understandings is the ultimate goal of
contract interpretation. Where there is likely to be a gap, a thicker use
meaning rule, despite its extra costs, might be the better design choice.
The question, then, is when the literal meaning of parties’ words is
more likely to correspond to the parties’ actual agreement. This is likely to
be so in either of two situations: when parties are aware that their
agreement will be subject to a plain meaning rule and make an effort to
state in express terms their actual agreement, and when parties have a
second-order intention that they be governed by the literal or plain meaning
of their words.
Just as responsive parties are likely react to formalistic altering rules
by using the formality when they want to achieve the associated legal
change, so they are likely to respond to a plain meaning rule by writing in
express language the details of their agreement. Doing so entails drafting
costs. It takes more time and effort to memorialize every detail of the
parties’ actual understanding. But for reasons discussed above, the result
should be lower litigation costs to achieve accurate and more predictable
174
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outcomes. When it comes to responsive parties, therefore, the choice
between thick literal and thin use meaning rules involves the commonly
recognized tradeoff between drafting costs at the time of formation and
decision costs at the time of adjudication.175
Evaluating the tradeoff again raises empirical questions that are not
only difficult to answer, but are also likely to have different answers for
different types of transactions. One set of questions concerns the relative
magnitudes of the costs of drafting and the costs of adjudication under
various rules. A second is about predictability. Just how much more
predictable are plain meaning rules than thicker forms of interpretation?
And how much do parties value that predictability? A third set of questions
is about how responsive parties actually are. When are parties likely to
react to a plain meaning rule by expressing themselves in clearer terms,
reducing the likelihood that a plain meaning rule will result in
correspondence errors?
The third question is crucial. Scholars who use economic models
commonly assume that sophisticated parties are highly responsive to the
incentives legal rules create. Thus Alan Schwartz and Joel Watson have
argued that the task of an interpretive rule is not only to accurately recover
the parties’ actual agreement, but also “to induce parties to take optimal
actions . . . to facilitate accurate type identification.”176 Other writers doubt
whether legal interpretive rules much affect parties’ behavior. As far back as
1885, writing about the Statue of Frauds, Justice James Stephen and
Fredrick Pollock argued:
One cardinal rule, which those who legislate on the common
business of life ought always to bear in mind, is that the power of
law to control conduct is small, and is constantly exaggerated. Laws
ought to be adjusted to the habits of society, and not aim at
remoulding them. The cases in which any law is actually enforced
are infinitesimally small in number in comparison with those in
which it has no effect whatsoever. Custom, and what is called
common sense, regulate the great mass of human transactions.177
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In fact, this is likely another area in which generalizations are difficult. We
should expect the incentive effects of interpretive rules to depend in large
part on who the parties are, the nature and stage of the transaction, and the
type of communication at issue.
There is a second situation in which a plain or literal meaning rule
perforce captures the parties’ actual intent and agreement: when parties
have agreed to be governed by the plain or literal meaning of their words.
This is how Williston explains why integrated writings should be subject to
plain meaning interpretation:
[I]n case of a writing wholly informal in character [i.e., not under
seal], but which nevertheless was adopted by the parties as a
statement of their bargain [i.e., integrated], the same principle is
applicable. The parties have assented to those words as binding
upon them. In an ordinary oral contract or one made by
correspondence, the minds of the parties are not primarily
addressed to the symbols which they are using; they are considering
the things for which the symbols stand. Where, however, they
incorporate their agreement into a writing they have attempted more
than to assent by means of symbols to certain things, they have
assented to the writing as the adequate expression of the things to
which they agree.178
When parties have a second-order intention that a writing’s plain meaning
shall govern, there is a sense in which the content of their actual agreement
is just that plain meaning—even if at the time of formation one or both had
a different understanding of it. Just as a game show contestant has chosen
the object behind Door Number One, whether it turns out to be a goat or a
trip to Paris, so parties might choose to be governed by the plain meaning
of their words, whatever that plain meaning turns out to be. Where the
parties have such a second-order intention, the accurate identification of
plain meaning automatically achieves correspondence accuracy.
Again it is an empirical question whether or when parties have such
second-order intentions. The easy case is when parties have expressly
agreed to a plain or literal meaning rule—when parties say in their
agreement that they wish to be governed by its plain or literal meaning. For
example:
The Parties’ legal obligations under this . . . Agreement are to be
determined from the precise and literal language of this . . .
Agreement and not from the imposition of state laws attempting to
impose additional duties of good faith, fair dealing or fiduciary
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obligations that were not the express basis of the bargain at the time
this Agreement was made.179
Another easy case is where the parties expressly agree to a thick usemeaning rule. In Corthell v. Summit Thread Co., for example, a Maryland
court considered an employment agreement that “specified that the terms of
the contract were ‘to be interpreted in good faith on the basis of what is
reasonable and intended, and not technically.’”180
The more interesting cases are those in which the parties do not say
one way or the other. In these situations, courts might look to other
evidence of or proxies for the parties’ second-order agreement to be
governed by their words’ plain meaning. As noted in section 2.2.3 above,
US courts commonly use integration as such a proxy, perhaps based on the
Willistonian presumption that parties who adopt an integrated writing
probably to intend to be governed by it plain meaning. Whether such a
presumption is correct turns in part on the rules that determine when a
writing is integrated, which are considered in Part Four.
A plain meaning rule that parties have not chosen for themselves is
likely to generate correspondence errors when parties are unresponsive to
the legal rule, and so fail to express their agreement or intentions in clear
terms.181 The rules of contemporary contract law attach legal consequences
to a wide variety of nonjuristic acts—making an agreement, saying
something about the quality of goods, manifesting an intention to perform
despite the nonoccurrence of a condition, expressing doubts that one will
perform, and so forth. Sometimes when parties satisfy these nonjuristic
altering rules they are not thinking about the legal consequences of their
words or actions. When this is the case, parties are more likely to speak
elliptically, relying on their shared background and understanding of the
transaction. (“Go ahead, you’re all right; get your men out and don’t let that
worry you.”) In such circumstances, the literal meaning of the parties’
words—even if those words appear in a writing—is much less likely to
correspond to the speaker’s actual intentions or to the hearer’s reasonable
179
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understanding. If the law nonetheless adopts a plain meaning rule to
determine their meaning, the salient tradeoff is no longer increased drafting
costs in exchange for cheaper adjudication and greater predictability. It is,
rather, accepting a greater likelihood of correspondence error in exchange
for a cheaper adjudication. It is much less obvious that this is a tradeoff
lawmakers should make.
In short, to the extent we care about accuracy, thick use meaning or
actual agreement rules are desirable when we expect parties to be
unresponsive to the rule. When this is the case is again an empirical
question. With respect to contract formation, easy cases include implied-infact contracts and many oral agreements. Possible waivers and repudiations
are also good candidates for thicker interpretive rules. Somewhat more
difficult cases are those in which the parties have expressed all or part of
their agreement in writing, but it is not obvious that they were treating that
writing as a legally effective document. More generally and crucially,
whenever an altering rule specifies a nonjuristic altering act, it is always
possible that parties who perform it are not thinking about legal
consequences. In such circumstances, thicker use meaning altering rules
are more likely to capture the speaker’s intent and the hearer’s reasonable
understanding.
A final factor to consider in thinking about the choice between plain
meaning rules and thicker use meaning or actual agreement rules is the
likely effects of each on the parties’ extralegal relationship. As I have
observed, many contractual transactions depend for their success on more
than the law of contracts. Honor, friendship, community, reputation, repeat
play, a moral sense and other nonlegal sources of trust often add
considerable value to a transaction. It is unlikely that legal enforcement
would have no effect on these extralegal aspects of exchange relationships.
It is not, however, a priori obvious what the effect will be. With respect to
rules of interpretation, Lisa Bernstein has argued that some thicker rules can
interfere with the development of extralegal forms of assurance.182 The
UCC’s permissive rules for course of dealings and course of performance
evidence, Bernstein argues, are likely to deter parties from the sort of
cooperative flexibility that generate extralegal forms of trust. A responsive
party might worry that its failure to insist on strict performance will later be
used to interpret its agreement, thereby eroding its legal entitlement. These
thick interpretive rules thereby discourage the flexible give-and-take that
characterizes extralegal forms of trust. Others have argued that the drafting
incentives plain meaning rules create pose their own threat to extralegal
trust. Richard Posner, invoking his years of experience on the bench,
highlights the costs of writing highly detailed contracts:
182
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There is frequent conflict between lawyer and client over how
detailed a contract should be, the former pushing for the inclusion
of endless protective clauses and the latter worrying that pressing for
such clauses will not only protract negotiations and increase legal
fees but also make him seem a sharpie and kill the deal. Better that
the contract should be kept reasonably short, and that if an
unforeseen contingency arises it be resolved in a commonsensical
fashion. It is reassuring to think that if one’s contract should come to
grief the court will straighten matters out in a “reasonable” way
rather than by recourse to legal technicalities. Businessmen want
judges to resolve interpretive issues in the way that a reasonable
businessman would.183
To the extent plain meaning rules push parties to spell out in advance every
aspect of their transaction, they too might deter the development of
extralegal forms of assurance.184 Again we have reached a point where the
right answer depends on empirical facts. And again the relevant costs are
likely to turn on who the parties are, the type of transaction, market
conditions, and the like.
The above discussion can be summarized as a list of factors relevant
to deciding when to apply plain meaning rules and when thicker use
meaning rules are more appropriate. In adopting per se rules for the
admissibility of any given type of interpretive evidence, lawmakers should
consider (1) gains in interpretive accuracy; (2) additional costs of
adjudication; (3) savings in the costs of drafting; (4) reductions in the
predictability of interpretive outcomes; and (5) relational costs or benefits;
and (6) the likelihood of correspondence errors. The factors are not
independent of one another. If parties are responsive, for example, thin
interpretive rules result in more detailed written agreements, thereby
reducing the gains in correspondence accuracy to be had from thicker
forms of interpretation. All six factors are likely to depend on who the
parties are, the transaction type, market conditions, and the like. Generally
speaking, however, plain meaning rules are likely to work when parties are
183
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attuned to the legal rules that govern their transaction—whether because
they are performing a juristic act, because they are responsive to the default
or mandatory rule, or because they have agreed to a plain meaning rule
themselves. When an altering rule does not presuppose parties’ intent to
effect a legal change and parties are not likely attuned to the legal effects of
their words and acts, thicker use meaning or actual agreement rules are
preferable.
One more comment on the above analysis. I have been treating
both interpretive and correspondence accuracy as if they were simple
goods. But theorists disagree on just how valuable accuracy is—on how to
weigh the accuracy gains of thicker interpretive rules against their various
costs. Schwartz and Scott, for example, argue that sophisticated risk-neutral
firms do not care about accuracy in any given case. “A risk-neutral party
cares about the mean of the interpretation distribution but not the
variance.”185 So long as interpretive errors are as likely to benefit as to harm
the firm, the cost of those inaccuracies will in the long run even out. From
the perspective of a risk-neutral firm, “it is good enough that courts get
things right on average.”186 Schwartz and Scott deploy this argument in
support of a very thin default rule of interpretation. For risk-neutral firms,
the accuracy gains from admitting additional evidence are unlikely to justify
the additional costs in litigation. “Therefore, the best interpretive default for
firms is textualist when the issue is what their contract language meant.”187
Schwartz and Scott’s argument has among its premises not only that
firms are risk neutral, but also that the primary goal in enforcing contracts
between them is to maximize the joint gains of trade. “The contract law of
commercial parties is about efficiency.”188 But this is hardly the only
function contract enforcement might serve, whether for contracts between
firms or for contracts among other types of parties. A theorist who considers
an important function of contract law to be enforcing parties’ moral
obligations, achieving a just outcome between the parties, or supporting the
moral culture of making and keeping agreements is likely to attach greater
value to interpretive accuracy than do Schwartz and Scott. Of course it is
no surprise that the optimal rules of contract law depend in part on the
broader functions that contract law is meant to serve. But it is worth
keeping in mind that the value of interpretive accuracy depends also on
purpose of contract enforcement more generally.
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4

Application: The Parol Evidence Rule and Integration

As E.B. and Katherine White famously observed, “Humor can be
dissected, as a frog can, but the thing dies in the process and the innards
are discouraging to any but the purely scientific mind.”189 The same can be
said of legal theory. Having dissected the rules of contract exposition,
perhaps to death, this Part applies the theory to critically examine an
important but understudied part of the living parol evidence rule: how
courts decide when an agreement is integrated. I have already discussed the
connection between the parol evidence rule and plain meaning formalism.
Most courts treat integration as sufficient to trigger plain meaning
interpretation of a writing. Here I am interested in a different aspect: the
rule for determining that a writing is integrated, or the parol evidence
altering rule.
The basic idea of the parol evidence rule is that sometimes a writing
should be given more weight than other evidence of the parties’ contractual
agreement. If the adjudicator finds the writing to be fully integrated, the
parties may not attempt to prove terms that do not appear in it. If the
adjudicator finds that the writing is partially integrated, parties may not
attempt to prove terms contrary to those in the writing. In either case, in
most US jurisdictions integration triggers one or another plain meaning rule,
limiting the extrinsic evidence that can go into interpretation of the writing.
These are the legal effects of integration. What interests me here is
the rule for deciding whether a writing is integrated—rules that scholars
often neglect. For example, although Jody Kraus and Robert Scott argue at
length that most sophisticated commercial parties want courts to apply
formalist rules of interpretation to their integrated agreements, they say
nothing about how courts should tell when a writing is integrated. They
observe only that courts “have devised various neutral tests for determining
whether parties intended to integrate part or all of their agreement into a
final, legally enforceable writing.”190 But these rules are hardly neutral, and
they vary across jurisdictions. A theory of contract exposition should have
something to say about the altering rules that effect plain meaning rules.
The modern view, which dates to Wigmore,191 holds that absent a
seal, integration depends on the parties’ intentions. A writing is integrated
when and only when the parties have agreed that it shall be a final
statement of some or all of the terms of their contract. As Williston
explained: “The parol evidence rule does not apply to every contract of
189
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which there is written evidence, but only applies where the parties to an
agreement reduce it to writing, and agree or intend that that writing shall be
their agreement.”192 It its 1986 report on the parol evidence rule, the English
Law Commission emphasized this agreement-based understanding to reach
a fairly radical conclusion.
[A]lthough a proposition of law can be stated which can be
described as the “parol evidence rule” it is not a rule of law which,
correctly applied, could lead to evidence being unjustly excluded.
Rather, it is a proposition of law which is no more than a circular
statement: when it is proved or admitted that the parties to a
contract intended that all the express terms of their agreement
should be a recorded in a particular document or documents,
evidence will be inadmissible (because irrelevant) if it is tendered
only for the purpose of adding to, varying, subtracting from or
contradicting the express terms of a contract. We have considerable
doubts whether such a proposition should properly be characterized
as a “rule” at all.193
If integration is merely one contract term among others, what has
traditionally been called the “parol evidence rule” is no more than
enforcement of the parties’ agreement—hence not a rule at all. It is not the
existence of the writing that matters, but the fact that the parties have
agreed that it shall serve as a final statement of some or all of the terms of
their agreement.194
Despite its rhetorical power, the Law Commission erred in
concluding that an agreement-based parol evidence rule is not in fact a
rule. First, if parties have the power to attach special significance to a
writing, it is only because contract law gives them that power. That is, it is
only because there is a rule of construction that gives legal effect to
agreements to integrate. Second, at least in the United States the parties’
agreement to a writing as a final statement of some or all terms does more
than exclude extrinsic evidence of contrary or additional terms. It also
triggers plain meaning interpretation, whether or not the parties have
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agreed to that interpretive rule.195 This rule of construction extends beyond
interpretation of the parties’ agreement. Third, even if integration is a matter
of agreement, we require a rule that says how such agreement must be
expressed or evidenced if it is to be legally effective. We require, in other
words, a parol evidence altering rule.196
US courts recognize two ways parties can effectively express or
evince their shared intent to integrate.197 First, parties can include in the
writing a merger clause. A merger clause expressly says that the parties
intend the writing as the final statement of some or all terms. For example:
This instrument embodies the whole agreement of the parties. There
are no promises, terms, conditions, or obligations other than those
contained in this contract, and this contract shall supersede all
previous communications, representations, or agreements, either
verbal or written, between the parties.198
Second, if the writing contains no merger clause, courts look to whether the
writing appears to be intended as final statement of some or all terms of the
parties’ agreement. Thus the Second Restatement provides, “[w]here the
parties reduce an agreement to a writing which in view of its completeness
and specificity reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, it is taken
to be an integrated agreement.”199 There is an important difference between
these two cases. When the parties agree to a merger clause, they say how
they intend the writing to be used. When an adjudicator finds integration
absent a merger clause, it relies not on the communicative content of what
the parties said about integration, but on the adjudicator’s interpretation of
their likely intentions or understandings absent such a communication. In
the one case, the decision maker can look to their acts of agreement. In the
other, the rule looks to their actual agreement in the absence of such acts.
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US authorities differ on what interpretive evidence an adjudicator
may consider to determine whether a writing is integrated.200 Jurisdictions
that adopt so-called hard parol evidence rules, commonly associated with
Williston, employ a thin test for integration. If a writing appears on its face
to be a complete statement of all the parties’ obligations, it is fully
integrated. “[T]he contract must appear on its face to be incomplete in
order to permit parol evidence of additional terms.”201 Jurisdictions with socalled soft parol evidence rules, associated with Corbin, employ a thicker
test. The decision maker should always consider all available evidence of
the parties’ intent, even if the writing includes a merger clause. “If the
offered evidence is relevant and credible on the issue of either
interpretation or integration, it should never be excluded, for the reason
that, whatever are the written words, those issues are always debatable.”202
The most recent edition of Williston acknowledges that the Second
Restatement adopts a thick test for integration, but reports that the thin test
remains the majority rule.203 The most recent edition of Farnsworth’s
treatise, on the contrary, suggests that “the prevailing view [is] that other
evidence, including evidence of prior negotiations, is still admissible to
show that a writing was not intended as a final expression of the terms it
contains.”204 Under either rule extrinsic evidence may be introduced to
show an invalidating cause such as misrepresentation, duress or mistake.
What should we make of this collection of parol evidence altering
rules? The theory developed in this article suggests several critical
observations.
First, it is somewhat odd that US law does not provide a formality
with which parties can signal their intent to integrate. The parol evidence
rule is a power-conferring one. It allows parties to determine by agreement
the legal effects of a writing. Similarly, a merger clause is commonly a
juristic act. It says that the parties intend, by the very expression of that
intent, that the law shall treat the writing as the definitive statement of some
or all of their legal obligations. A short, canonical form with which to
express such an intent would be extremely useful. Although form books are
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full of possible merger clauses, there exists in US law no short, effective,
standard formula, comparable to “F.O.B.” or “as is,” that parties can use to
integrate a writing. The seal once served such a purpose. But it was always
a blunt instrument, as putting a writing under seal had other legal effects as
well. A non-requisite formality—such as printing the words “Final
Statement of All Terms” or “Final Statement of Terms Included” at the top of
a document—would provide parties who wish to integrate a writing a
useful tool for doing so. That we have no such formality is a historical
accident, attributable perhaps to the general decline of formalities in the
early twentieth century.
Second, it is more than a little curious that courts are willing to find
writings to be integrated absent merger clauses. Why have a rule that
permits courts to look for parties’ actual but unexpressed intent to integrate?
Why not require parties sophisticated enough to agree to integrate a writing
to express their agreement in words?
An actual agreement altering rule instructs adjudicators to look
beyond parties’ words to other evidence of their beliefs and intentions.
Generally speaking, such a rule is desirable when parties’ words are
unlikely to reflect their actual agreement. Thus the comments to UCC
section 2-202 explain that course of dealings, course of performance and
usage of trade are always admissible “in order that the true understanding
of the parties as to the agreement may be reached.”205 In short, the reason to
adopt actual agreement rules is to avoid Type II correspondence errors:
instances in which parties intend an outcome, but fail to say so.
But parties sophisticated enough to intend a writing as a final
statement of terms would likely be responsive to a rule requiring them to
say so. Type II correspondence errors are unlikely to be much of a problem
with respect to integration. And there are significant costs to the actual
agreement rule. First, it is not obvious that, absent a merger clause, ex post
adjudicators are very good at identifying the parties’ objective intent with
respect to integration—no matter what evidence they are allowed to
consider. If they are not, an actual agreement rule might generate more
Type I and II interpretive errors—false positives and false negative—than
the Type II correspondence errors it avoids. Second, an actual agreement
rule does so with higher costs of adjudication and reduced predictability of
outcomes. Third, requiring parties who wish to integrate a writing to say so
can put nonsophisticated parties on notice of the legal effects of the writings
they sign, reducing Type I correspondence errors.
A third even more puzzling feature is the combination in hard parol
evidence rules of an actual agreement altering rule with evicentiary
formalism. A rule that limits evidence of integration to the document itself
might make sense when parties expressly say that a writing is the final
statement of terms, especially in a negotiated agreement between parties
205
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represented by counsel. Parties who are sophisticated enough to knowingly
agree to a merger clause are likely to take extra care to ensure that their
words match their intentions—including the words of the merger clause.
Absent a merger clause, however, it is not obvious why courts should not
consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ actual intentions with respect to
integration. As Wigmore argued,
The document alone will not suffice. What it was intended to cover
cannot be known till we know what there was to cover. The
question being whether certain subjects of negotiation were
intended to be covered, we must compare the writing and the
negotiations before we can determine whether they were in fact
covered.206
Without the parties’ clear statement one way or another, the interpretation
of their actual agreement as to the legal effect of a writing is necessarily
uncertain. Relevant extrinsic evidence should always be of value in
ascertaining the parties’ intent to integrate.
So why does contemporary contract law not require parties who
intend a writing as a final statement of their agreement to add a few words
to that effect? And why don’t jurisdictions with hard parol evidence rules at
least look to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent to integrate when the
parties have not said one way or another? Although ex post justifications
are always possible, the explanation of these components of the parol
evidence altering rule probably lies in the rule’s history. Whereas today
agreement-based accounts of the rule are the norm, the rule’s origins can
be traced to two other features of early English law: the best evidence rule
and a desire to control the jury. The best evidence rule established an
evidentiary hierarchy: written evidence, which was commonly under seal,
could not be contradicted by oral evidence. “An inferior matter [was]
admissible neither in opposition to nor in substitution for superior.”207 This
was a simple rule of evidence, not agreement. The writing’s weight came
not from the parties’ intentions, but from its form. At the same time, as
Wigmore observes, there was a judicial desire “to keep from the jury all
alleged oral transactions which might be misused by them to overturn the
words of a writing.”208
If the parties were allowed to put in averments extraneous to the
writing, it must go to the jury, and there was no telling what the jury
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might do; but if the judges took exclusive charge, they could better
control the situation.209
Mistrust of the jury required a rule that did not merely give the written word
greater weigh, but rendered it dispositive.
These historical roots suggest reasons for the contemporary parol
evidence altering rule that have little to do with enforcing the parties’
agreement with respect to integration. Allowing courts to find integration in
the absence of a merger clause, based only on a writing’s apparent
completeness, effectively puts a thumb on the scale in favor of integration,
and thereby also plain meaning interpretation. If a writing looks to the
judge like a final document, she has the power to decide that the writing is
legally controlling, to interpret it according to its plain meaning, and to
avoid sending questions of interpretation to the jury. The altering rule is
structured not only to effectuate the parties’ intentions, but also to favor
judicial plain meaning interpretation of certain documents.
One reason to adopt such a rule might be an abiding belief that
writings are more reliable evidence than other types of parol evidence, and
especially testimony of oral agreement.210 Another might be distrust of the
jury when it comes to the interpretation and construction of contractual
agreements, or the evaluation of parol evidence.211 A third might Fuller’s
channeling function. A rule that favors a finding of integration puts
responsive parties on notice that they should be careful with the words they
write down. A fourth might be a belief that plain meaning rules are the
majoritarian default for contractual writings. Scott and Schwartz, for
example, agree that parties should be able to decide how their rules are
construed, but rather than focusing on the altering rule, they emphasize
finding the right default.212 If one believes that most parties prefer plain
209
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meaning rules, one way to satisfy their preference is a rule that favors a
finding of integration.
I am skeptical as to whether these reasons are enough to justify the
actual agreement parol evidence altering rules most courts employ, and
especially rules that exclude extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.
Whether they are or not, however, the above analysis demonstrates three
things. First, contra the Law Review Commission, even if integration is
merely a matter of agreement, there remains such a thing as a parol
evidence rule. It is the rule of construction that determines what evidence
of the parties’ intent suffices to for a finding of integration. Second,
lawmakers would do well to provide sophisticated parties with a formality
they could use to integrate their writings. Third, the existing test for
integration strongly suggests that the rule is not only about realizing the
parties’ intent at the lowest possible cost. If that were the only goal, courts
would require parties to say when they intended a writing as integrated, or
courts would at least consider extrinsic evidence of their intent. The parol
evidence altering rules one finds on the books are designed to give special
weight to the plain meaning of the written word.
Finally, it is worth thinking a bit more about party responsiveness,
and especially about how courts should determine whether contracts of
adhesion between sophisticated and nonsophisticated parties are
integrated.
The Draft Restatement (Third) of Consumer Contracts suggests a very
different parol evidence altering rule for such agreements. Under the Draft’s
rule, standard terms and merger clauses in such agreements would generate
only a weak presumption of integration.213 That presumption would then be
“rebutted when the standard contract terms contradict or unreasonably limit
an affirmation or promise, which is made part of the basis of the bargain
between the business and the consumer.”214 Such a rule would treat the
altering acts courts commonly use to find integration, including merger
clauses, as highly defeasible—so defeasible as to arguably gut the parol
evidence rule of its force. A consumer could always introduce extrinsic
evidence of contrary material terms to demonstrate that she did not consent
to the writing as a final statement of terms.
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It is unclear whether the case law fully supports this proposed
rule. It is, however, supported by the broader theory of the Draft Third
Restatement, and by the design considerations identified in Part Three of
this article. The Draft emphasizes evidence that consumers do not read
most of the terms in contracts of adhesion.
215

It is presumed that standard contract terms do not affect the
contracting decisions of a substantial number of consumers. This
presumption applies most forcefully when the standard contract
term is part of a long-list of fine-print terms; it is rebutted when the
standard contract term is, e.g., a conspicuous price or delivery
fee.216
In the language of the above analysis, consumers often are not responsive
to the terms in the writings to which they agree, much less to the legal rules
that govern their agreements. These are circumstances in which evidentiary
formalism and plain meaning rules are likely to cause correspondence
errors—in which the literal or plain meaning of a writing less likely to
correspond to one party’s actual intent and understanding. The solution is
to always permit the decision maker to consider evidence from outside the
writing. In practice, it matters little whether this is stated as an easily
defeasible altering rule, which is the approach of the Draft Third
Restatement takes, or as a thick interpretive rule for merger clauses, which
is how Corbin frames his preferred rule. Both are ways to avoid interpretive
formalism when determining whether a consumer contract of adhesion is
integrated.
Conclusion
When courts are asked to adjudicate disputes about what
contractual agreements mean, they often recite lists of familiar maxims so
general and sometimes conflicting that they can appear meaningless. “The
fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is that agreements
are construed in accord with the parties’ intent.”217 “The best evidence of
what parties to a written agreement intend is what they say in their
writing.”218 “The intent of the parties as expressed in writing is determined
from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties
215
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and the circumstances connected with the transaction.”219 “The meaning of
a contract is found by examination of the entire instrument and not by
viewing clauses or phrases in isolation.”220 “In reviewing contract language
for other possible interpretations, we are required to interpret the language
in an ordinary and popular sense as would a person of average intelligence
and experience.”221 “[S]trong extrinsic evidence indicating an intent
contrary to the plain meaning of the agreement’s terms can create an
ambiguity—provided that the evidence is objective.”222
This article has attempted to locate these and other rules within a
general account of contract exposition. The above discussion provides a
rubric for evaluating the rules that govern the legal effects of contracting
parties’ words and actions. Too often the design question is framed as a
simple choice between Willistonian formalism and Corbinite
contextualism. Although that choice is central, it is not simple. The right
approach to contract interpretation depends on the rules of contract
construction, and especially on the altering rules that determine when a
default legal state of affairs no longer pertains. Deciding on the correct
altering rule requires considering multiple design questions that are unlikely
to have the same answers across all types of transactions, legal questions,
and altering acts. Salient questions include: Should the altering rule employ
a legal formality, either as a sufficient to effect a legal change or as both
necessary and sufficient to do so? If lawmakers adopt a formalistic altering
rule, what formal act should it require? What should their legal effects be,
and should they be defeasible or nondefeasible? If lawmakers opt for an
interpretive rule, how much evidence of what types should interpreters
consider? Should they seek the literal meaning, common or local, of the
parties’ words, their use meaning, with or without extrinsic evidence, or the
parties’ actual intentions and understandings? And what circumstances
should suffice to trigger more or less formalist interpretive rules?
Adjudicators need not answer all these questions in every case. What is
important is that in hard cases they be able to locate the question before
them within the logical space of contract exposition.
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